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ABSTRACT 
The conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan have provided an undeniable storyline: U.S. 
forces can conduct a conventional mission better than any in the world, but that 
mission, accomplished in short order, leaves behind a situation for which 
conventional forces and equipment are ill-prepared.  This situation requires a 
new mission: Stability Operations. The blue-water is not where these 21st 
century conflicts will likely take place, and forces such as the U.S. Navy 
Riverines are among the many forces that provide a capability to integrate and 
communicate with local populations that cannot be matched by blue-water 
forces. While the riverine force’s mission set is one that could become heavily 
utilized in stability operations, the ability to conduct those missions is currently 
hindered by a lack of implementation of information technology.  The current 
disadvantages that greatly increase operational risk include a reduced capability 
to engage the population, reduced situational awareness, and limited 
communication reach-back capability.  A riverine force properly equipped with 
and trained with biometric, unmanned, and information sharing systems would 
provide the NECC, and U.S. Navy as a whole, a more comprehensive ability to 
conduct stability operations in brown-water areas, something no other 
conventional Navy unit can currently accomplish.  
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION...................................................................... 3 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE .................................................................... 4 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH......................................................... 4 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION.................................................................... 4 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES...................................................... 5 
II. RIVERINE FORCE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS ............................... 7 
A. STABILITY OPERATIONS .................................................................. 7 
B. RIVERINE FORCE INTRODUCTION AND CAPABILITIES ................ 8 
1. Introduction.............................................................................. 8 
2. Objectives................................................................................. 9 
3. Capabilities............................................................................. 11 
C. RIVERINE FORCE LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS.................. 13 
1. Key Limitations ...................................................................... 13 
2. Timing..................................................................................... 15 
3. Threat Environment............................................................... 16 
D. U.S. NAVY RIVERINE—MY EXPERIENCE ON THE RIVER ............ 17 
E. ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS............................................................ 21 
III. BIOMETRICS................................................................................................ 23 
A. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 23 
B. IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................... 24 
1. Current Implementation ........................................................ 24 
2. Potential Implementation ...................................................... 26 
C. BIOMETRICS IN USE........................................................................ 28 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief ............................ 28 
2. Counterinsurgency................................................................ 31 
3. Government and Security Force Development ................... 35 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 38 
IV. UNMANNED SYSTEMS ............................................................................... 39 
A. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 39 
B. IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................... 40 
1. Current Implementation ........................................................ 40 
2. Potential Implementation ...................................................... 43 
C. UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN USE........................................................ 45 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief ............................ 46 
2. Counterinsurgency................................................................ 49 
3. Government and Security Force Development ................... 53 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 57 
V. INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS ......................................................... 59 
A. OVERVIEW ........................................................................................ 59 
 viii
B. IMPLEMENTATION ........................................................................... 61 
1. Current Implementation ........................................................ 61 
2. Potential Implementation ...................................................... 66 
C. INFORMATION SHARING IN USE.................................................... 68 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief ............................ 68 
2. Counterinsurgency................................................................ 72 
3. Government and Security Force Development ................... 76 
D. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 80 
VI. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 83 
A. A NEWLY EQUIPPED NAVAL RIVERINE FORCE........................... 83 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE ........................................ 85 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................................... 87 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 89 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ............................................................................... 103 
 
 ix
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Riverine patrol boat (From Stone, 2009) ............................................ 12 
Figure 2. Phasing model (From U.S. JCS, 2008) .............................................. 15 
Figure 3. Notional operation plan phases versus level of military effort  (From 
U.S. JCS, 2008) ................................................................................. 16 
Figure 4. Levels of threat (From U.S. JCS, 2010).............................................. 17 
Figure 5. Lake Qadisiyah, Al Anbar Province, Iraq ............................................ 18 
Figure 6. Biometric automated toolset (BAT) (From Jennings, 2009)................ 24 
Figure 7. Hand-Held Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) 
(From Jennings, 2009) ....................................................................... 26 
Figure 8. Fingerprints from a victim of the 2004 Tsunami are examined by a 
forensic expert in Phuket, Thailand (From Jennings & Chan, 2005) .. 30 
Figure 9. Displaced persons gather along a waterway after the  2010 Haiti 
earthquake (From McNamee, 2010)................................................... 31 
Figure 10. A U.S. Marine hands a local Afghan in Marja a free radio  after 
inputting his data into the BAT system (From Hunt, 2010) ................. 33 
Figure 11. An Iraqi Solider assigned to Iraqi Riverine Police Force during 
special boat maneuvers and weapon handling training (From Aho, 
2006) .................................................................................................. 38 
Figure 12. Silver Fox UAS (From Office of Naval Research, 2009)..................... 41 
Figure 13. Mark Scovill, Commanding Officer, USS TORTUGA (LSD-46) 
surveys  the extent of flooding in the 9th Ward, New Orleans, LA, 
after  Hurricane Katrina (From Watkins, 2005) ................................... 48 
Figure 14. Functional Flow of the Kill Chain (From Beaver et al., 2006).............. 51 
Figure 15. Crop Analysis with imagery provided by UAV (From Volger, 2006).... 55 
Figure 16. Harris AN/PRC-117F Radio (From Olive-drab.com, 2010)................. 62 
Figure 17. A Blue Force Tracker screen capture (From Kabis, 2008) ................. 63 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. U.S. Navy Riverine Mission-Essential Tasks  (From U.S. 
Department of the Navy (DON), 2008) ............................................... 10 
Table 2. HA/DR biometrics objectives and capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 
2006) .................................................................................................. 28 
Table 3. Counterinsurgency biometrics objectives and capabilities  (From 
U.S. JCS, 2006) ................................................................................. 32 
Table 4. Government and security force development biometrics objectives 
and capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 2006) ............................................. 35 
Table 5. Density of named systems within each JCA (From OSD, 2009) ........ 42 
Table 6. HA/DR unmanned systems objectives and capabilities  (From U.S. 
JCS, 2006) ......................................................................................... 46 
Table 7. Counterinsurgency unmanned systems objectives and capabilities  
(From U.S. JCS, 2006) ....................................................................... 50 
Table 8. Government and security force development unmanned systems 
objectives and capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 2006) ............................ 53 
Table 9. Information sharing enhances the concepts of C4I............................. 60 
Table 10. HA/DR information sharing objectives and capabilities from  (U.S. 
JCS, 2006) ......................................................................................... 69 
Table 11. Counterinsurgency information sharing objectives and capabilities  
From (U.S. JCS, 2006) ....................................................................... 73 
Table 12. Government and security force development information sharing 
objectives and capabilities from (U.S. JCS, 2006).............................. 77 
 
 xii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AAR   After Action Report 
ASW   Anti-Submarine Warfare 
BAT   Biometric Automated Toolset 
BIMA   Biometrics Identity Management Agency 
BFT   Blue Force Tracker 
BTF   Biometrics Task Force 
C4I   Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and  
Intelligence 
CALL   Center for Army Lessons Learned 
CBR   Chemical, Biological, and Radiological 
CENTRIXS  Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange  
System 
CIMILink  Civil-Military Link 
COIN   Counterinsurgency 
COP   Common Operational Picture 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DON   Department of the Navy 
DSU   Dam Security Unit 
ECP   Entry Control Point 
EFP   Explosively Formed Penetrator 
EOD   Explosive Ordnance Disposal 
FOB   Forward Operating Base 
FY   Fiscal Year 
GAO   Government Accountability Office 
GCE   Ground Combat Element 
GPS   Global Positioning System 
HA/DR  Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief 
HIIDE   Hand-Held Interagency Identification Detection Equipment 
 xiv
HLZ   Helicopter Landing Zone 
HQ   Headquarters 
IED   Improvised Explosive Device 
IGO   International Government Organization 
IOC   Initial Operational Capability 
ISIC   Immediate Superior in Command 
ISR   Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
JCA   Joint Capability Area 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JOC   Joint Operating Concept 
JP   Joint Publication 
LOS   Line of Sight 
MCM   Mine Countermeasures 
MCO   Major Combat Operations 
MDA   Maritime Domain Awareness 
MEDEVAC  Medical Evacuation 
METOC  Meteorological and Oceanographic 
MSO   Maritime Security Operations 
MWD   Military Working Dog 
NAVAIR  Naval Air Systems Command 
NCIS   Navy Criminal Investigative Service 
NECC   Naval Expeditionary Combat Command 
NGO   Non-Governmental Organization 
NMET   Navy Mission Essential Task 
NMETL  Navy Mission Essential Task List 
NTS 2000  Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation Tracking System  
2000 
NTTP   Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
OIC   Officer in Charge 
OIF   Operation Iraqi Freedom 
 xv
OPLAN  Operational Plan 
OPNAV  Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
PMO   Program Management Office 
POSREP  Position Report 
POST   Peace Operations Support Tool 
PRT   Provincial Reconstruction Team 
QDR   Quadrennial Defense Review 
RIVGRU  Riverine Group 
RIVRON  Riverine Squadron 
RFI   Request For Information 
RMIO   Riverine Maritime Interdiction Operations 
RPB   Riverine Patrol Boat 
SEAD   Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses 
SFA   Security Force Assistance 
SHARE  Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting 
SIGACT  Significant Action 
SIGINT  Signals Intelligence 
SIPRNET  Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SITREP  Situation Report 
SOA   Speed of Advance 
SSE   Sensitive Site Exploitation 
SSTR   Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction 
SSTRO  Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction  
Operations 
STUAS  Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System 
SWO   Surface Warfare Officer 
TAO   Tactical Action Officer 
TOA   Table of Allowances 
TSE   Tactical Site Exploitation 
TTP   Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
 xvi
UAS   Unmanned Aircraft System 
UGV   Unmanned Ground Vehicle 
UMS   Unmanned Maritime System 
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund 
USA   United States Army 
USG   United States Government 
USMC  United States Marine Corps 
USN   United States Navy 
USV   Unmanned Surface Vehicle 
UUV   Unmanned Undersea Vehicle 
WBGP  Waterborne Guard Post 
WMD   Weapons of Mass Destruction 
 xvii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I owe the greatest thanks to my wife, Darcy Gray.  
Without her steadfast and unwavering support, this would not have been 
possible.  She encouraged me, motivated me, and never let me quit.  I owe this 
thesis to her. 
 I would also like to thank Keith Paquin, a fellow riverine who epitomizes a 
great Naval Officer.  We went to Iraq and Monterey together, and both times we 
found many occasions to depend on each other.  I am thankful for his friendship, 
his advice, and the many hours he spent reviewing this thesis. 
 I owe a great thanks to my thesis advisor, Professor Mitch Brown, and my 
second reader, Lt. Col. Karl Pfeiffer.  Without your great help, I might have failed 
in this endeavor.  Thank you for taking on the role of making sure I succeeded in 
the face of adversity. 
 Lastly, I would like to thank my NPS classmates from the IST curriculum.  
Justin Hayward, Lillian Abuan, Ryan King, Jeff Bennington, Dalton Clarke, James 
Fisher, Devine Johnson, you each made all the long hours and hard work worth 
it.  We succeeded at NPS as a team and I will miss you as we each go our 
separate ways. 
 xviii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 1
I. INTRODUCTION 
As the first decade of the 21st century fades, the revelation that the 
conflicts that will shape this new century will be very different from the last has 
become apparent.  The U.S. military faces two fundamental challenges as it 
confronts the challenges of contemporary conflict.   
First, the nature of warfare has changed.  No longer will battlefields exist 
where masses of forces face each other head-to-head.  No longer constrained by 
geography, the new battlefield is multidimensional, made up of regions of conflict 
to include land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.  The foes of the United States 
are not massed on a field or in a city.  They are agile, hidden from plain view, 
leverage global black-market, criminal, and terrorist networks, strike at new 
centers of gravity such as public opinion, and use U.S. technology dependency 
to their advantage.  Opposition forces know that to win, they must draw the 
United States into prolonged conflict, make the United States attempt the 
challenge of turning failed states into functioning democracies, and use the 
imperfections and horrific tolls of warfare to provide a relentless fuel for their 
information war in efforts to destabilize support for U.S. operations from both 
foreign and domestic audiences. 
The second challenge the U.S. military faces is internal.  The United 
States enjoys superior capability in forces, ships, aircraft, armor, etc., but they 
were all designed to meet the challenges of the last century.  The conflicts of Iraq 
and Afghanistan provide an undeniable storyline: U.S. forces can conduct 
conventional missions better than any in the world.  But those missions must be 
accomplished in short order, because sustained combat operations leave 
conventional forces ill-equipped and ill-prepared.  These situations led into a new 
mission area of Stability Operations.  Stability operations are a fundamental 
mission that the military must be prepared to conduct in the 21st century.  As 
discussed by Benbow, Ensminger, Swartz, Savitz, and Stimpson (2006), to face 
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this challenge, many things must change: doctrine, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures (TTP) must be revised; personnel must be available, trained, and 
educated; the logistics of supplies, maintenance, and infrastructure must be 
updated; and new systems, equipment, and vehicles need to be acquired. 
In order to meet these two challenges head-on, a fundamental question 
must be answered.  How can the Department of Defense (DoD) adapt to the new 
nature of contemporary conflict? The approach taken in the latter parts of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and since General McCrystal’s arrival in 
Afghanistan in the spring of 2009, has laid the foundation of how asymmetric 
warfare1 will be conducted in the 21st century.  More important than the use of 
conventional weapons and tactics, is how leveraging of information and 
communication with the local population has taken the forefront.  This new 
emphasis on communication and relationship building with local leaders requires 
U.S. forces to operate in such a way that they are embedded with the population, 
an environment that is rich in information.  To appropriately gather this 
information so it can be quickly utilized and then consolidated, analyzed, and 
shared with others, requires technology and techniques that are just recently 
starting to gain traction in the military.   
The vast requirements that must be fulfilled by the DoD in order to collect 
and leverage this information, thereby allowing for a more effective effort toward 
challenges of contemporary conflict, are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
However, this thesis will argue that the close examination of how one particular 
type of unit should be supplemented and adapted, can provide a construct for 
adapting other units in a similar manner.  The specific unit intended for 
exploration, and how they could be adapted to be a more effective force in 
contemporary conflict, is the U.S. Navy Riverine Forces.   
                                            
1 Asymmetric warfare–Warfare that displays a “disproportion of strength between the 
opponents at the outset, and from the difference in essence between their assets and liabilities” 
(Galula, 1964). 
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The Navy’s Riverine forces have a rich history of serving meritoriously in 
various conflicts, while being subjected to budgetary chopping blocks when these 
conflicts cease.  The fundamental reasoning behind such actions is that support 
for small river forces has difficulty competing with the rich, blue-water culture and 
tradition that runs through the Navy’s veins, and defense budgets that are 
artificially inflated during conflict.  The truth of the matter, though, is that the blue-
water is not where conflict in the 21st century will likely take place, and that 
forces such as riverines are among the many Navy Expeditionary Combat 
Command (NECC) forces that provide a capability to integrate and communicate 
with local populations, unmatched by blue-water forces.  This pronounced 
capability enables joint force commanders to utilize riverine forces to obtain and 
share information vital to attaining battlespace information superiority, a distinct 
and unique advantage. 
While the riverine force’s mission set is one that should become heavily 
utilized in stability operations, the ability to conduct those missions is currently 
hindered. Chapter II will describe and discuss stability operations and how 
riverine forces have a broad set of capabilities useful in performing those 
operations.  Additionally, the inherent limitations to what riverine forces can 
accomplish with the systems, equipment, and training they currently employ and 
the operational risk that is associated with this shortfall will be discussed.  The 
remaining chapters will argue that in order to reduce operational risk, the riverine 
forces should be supplemented with biometric, unmanned, and information 
sharing systems.  This enhanced capability will provide the joint force 
commander a significantly more valuable asset in which to leverage in stability 
operations.  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The U.S. Navy must find ways to use their most agile and adaptable 
forces to accomplish missions that blue-water forces cannot complete.  This  
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research will examine how the Naval Riverine Forces can provide a more 
effective information superiority capability to the joint force commander in stability 
operations. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The objective of this research is to analyze the current capabilities and 
limitations of the U.S. Navy Riverine Forces, and explain how they could be 
supplemented with new and emerging information technologies to enable them to 
become a force-multiplier in achieving information superiority in the joint 
battlespace. 
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
A properly equipped and trained riverine force would provide the NECC, 
and U.S. Navy as a whole, an improved ability to conduct stability operations in 
brown-water areas, something no other conventional Navy unit can accomplish.  
This capability is needed in order to make a valid and convincing argument for 
the continued retention of Naval Riverine capability after Operation Iraqi Freedom 
is concluded.  Ultimately, the value of the improved capability that is brought is 
much higher than the relatively small investment in dollars and people.  If 
implemented, the riverine forces will be cost effective, highly sought, and ably 
equipped to respond to joint force requirements in future stability operations.  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will examine the expanded mission capability gained by the 
U.S. Riverine Forces when supplemented with emerging technology.  Chapter II 
will discuss the capabilities and limitations of the riverine forces as they are 
currently trained and equipped.  Chapter III will describe the capabilities that 
could be gained through the utilization of biometric systems.  Chapter IV will 
provide feedback on how the expanded use of unmanned systems by the riverine 
forces could be advantageous.  Chapter V will discuss how information sharing 
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systems will allow supporting and supported units to take advantage of the 
collection capabilities of the riverine force.  Finally, Chapter VI will present a 
future enhanced riverine force that has executed an influx of emerging 
information technologies that will provide a vision for NECC and any other type 
commander who desires to prepare their small units for the stability operations 
that the 21st century will bring. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will consist of a review of U.S. National Defense Strategy, 
maritime strategy, and U.S. Department of Defense and Joint Force doctrine, 
directives, instructions, and publications.  Additionally, various resources utilized 
by the creators and subsequent commanders of the newly re-established riverine 
force investigating riverine force make-up, equipage, training, and mission set will 
be reviewed.  Lastly, various Naval Postgraduate School theses that discuss 
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II. RIVERINE FORCE CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS 
A. STABILITY OPERATIONS 
Stability operations,2 also sometimes referred to as Stabilization, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, describe the range of 
operations that occur beyond the scope of peace operations, but short of the 
scope required for combat operations.  The U.S. JCS (2006) says that stability 
operations: 
Focuses on the full range of military support that the future Joint 
Force might provide in foreign countries across the continuum from 
peace to crisis and conflict in order to assist a state or region that is 
under severe stress or has collapsed due to either a natural or 
man-made disaster.  A SSTR operation is not solely a military 
effort, but rather one that requires a carefully coordinated 
deployment of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and 
international assets.    
In order to advance U.S. government interests in a region and secure a 
lasting peace, there are various options that exist for military support to stability 
operations.  The following are a collection of possible activities that the U.S. JCS 
(2006) believes the U.S. Military could complete in support of stability operations: 
 Assist an existing or new host nation government in providing 
security, essential public services, economic development, and 
governance following the significant degradation or collapse of the 
government’s capabilities due to internal failure or as a 
consequence of the destruction and dislocation of a war;3 
                                            
2 Stability operations–An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, 
and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of 
national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential 
governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (U.S. 
JCS, 2001) 
3 In the case of the beleaguered fragile government, noted above, the armed opposition may 
take the form of an insurgency. In such cases, the SSTR operation is called a counterinsurgency 
(COIN) operation. 
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 Provide support to stabilize and administer occupied territory and 
care for refugees in major combat operations fought for limited 
objectives that fall short of forcibly changing the adversary regime; 
 Support a fragile national government that is faltering due to 
serious internal challenges, which include civil unrest, insurgency, 
terrorism and factional conflict; 
 Assist a stable government that has been struck by a devastating 
natural disaster;  
 Provide limited security cooperation assistance to a state that is 
facing modest internal challenges; and  
 Provide military assistance and training to partner nations that 
increase their capability and capacity to conduct SSTR operations 
at home or abroad.  
B. RIVERINE FORCE INTRODUCTION AND CAPABILITIES 
1. Introduction 
Riverine forces began their recent resurgence back into operational duty 
in 2006.  Deactivated since the Vietnam conflict, new riverine forces were 
created to fill a capability gap that was recognized during OIF.  Riverine Group 
(RIVGRU) One and Riverine Squadron (RIVRON) One were both established in 
2006, with RIVRONs 2 and 3 following soon after in 2007.  NECC (2010), which 
serves as RIVGRU One’s Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC), describes the 
riverine force as follows: 
 Three Riverine Squadrons, under one Riverine Group Commander, 
serve as a ready force for the Joint Forces Maritime Component 
Commander or Joint Forces Land Component Commander. 
 Each Riverine Squadron consists of specially designed craft, 
vehicles and unmanned systems configured to operate in a hostile 
riverine environment. The craft have multiple crews for near 
continuous operations and lift capacity for a small tactical unit. The 
headquarters element provides organic command, control, 
communications, computers and intelligence, force protection and 
logistics. 
 The Riverine Force provides the ability to conduct combat 
operations against small tactical, waterborne and unconventional 
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warfare units in a riparian environment and security force 
assistance and training to friendly nations.  
As will be discussed, riverine forces were designed to operate in all 
operations short of engaging a large enemy tactical force.  This design coupled 
with the NECC (2010) vision of riverine operations argues that they represent the 
exact type of force that would be needed to support stability operations. 
The nature of riverine operations requires forces tailored and 
packaged for the mission and environment assigned to the 
operational commander including maritime security operations 
(MSO) and security force assistance (SFA). MSOs deny violent 
extremist and criminal networks the use of the maritime 
environment as a venue for attack or to transport personnel, 
weapons or other material, and set the conditions for security and 
stability of regional nations. SFA entails protecting critical 
infrastructure; securing the area for military operations or 
commerce; preventing the flow of contraband; enabling power 
projection operations; joint, bilateral or multilateral exercises; 
conducting personnel exchanges; and participating in humanitarian 
assistance. 
2. Objectives 
According to DoD Instruction 3000.5, Stability Operations (2009), the DoD 
must be able to: 
 Establish civil security and civil control. 
 Restore or provide essential services. 
 Repair critical infrastructure. 
 Provide humanitarian assistance. 
While these objectives are quite broad, riverine forces can have a major 
impact in two of these areas: civil security/control and humanitarian assistance.  
The other two, restore/provide services and repair infrastructure, are more 
selective in the forces that would be required, but riverine forces are always able 
to assist in waterborne security and logistical support for virtually any mission in 
which they are not the main effort.  There are various missions included in the 
subset of the objectives outlined above.  As Oliver (2008) shows, these include 
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show of force, counterinsurgency, and counterterrorism as part of civil 
security/control and peace operations and non-combatant evacuation as part of 
humanitarian assistance.  Whatever the mission, there are tasks from the Navy 
Mission Essential Task List (NMETL) that comprise the various aspects of that 
mission.  All Navy Mission Essential Tasks (NMETs) that apply to Riverine 
Forces are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1.   U.S. Navy Riverine Mission-Essential Tasks  
(From U.S. Department of the Navy (DON), 2008) 
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These essential tasks are still broadly defined and are subject to unit TTPs 
on how to effectively complete them, but they do provide a baseline from which 
to identify where current capabilities and limitations are affecting the ability to 
accomplish any given mission.  It should be noted that Table 1 does not include 
stability operations, but each of the four operations mentioned in the table would 
be expected to be accomplished during the conduct of stability operations.  
3. Capabilities 
There are some key capabilities inherent with riverine forces that make 
them ideal for stability operations.  First and foremost is the operational area in 
which they are able to operate.  Riverine forces are able to fill a critical gap 
between where traditional land and maritime forces can effectively operate.  
These areas include rivers, deltas, harbors, canals, and many others.  This gap 
is especially crucial, because these riverine areas provide essential needs to the 
local population.  As Benbow et al. (2006) describes, these areas “sustain life 
with food and water, support agriculture, and provide a means of transportation 
and energy production.”  These areas also serve an even more crucial role in 
transportation, when traditional land-based transportation is limited or destroyed 
by natural disasters or conflict.  Because these areas are so important and are 
home to significant segments of the population, they can also serve as a key 
operational area during stability operations.   
In addition to access to areas that prove difficult for land units to reach, 
riverine areas allow for a speed to be achieved that is much greater than what 
can be achieved on land.  Currently, riverine assets regularly transit at 30 to 35 
knots.  The reason this speed is possible is because the threat is limited by the 
terrain.  Where the transit area is wide, the threat is limited by the effective range 
of the weapons in use; where the transit area is narrow, the speed limits the time 
in which the riverine asset is able to be identified and targeted.  Additionally, as 
technology has made the creation and use of improvised explosive devices 
(IEDs) more common along the roadways, the speed with which units can 
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operate on land has become even more constrained.  Speed is not only an asset 
in avoiding threats, but also in the ability to conduct operations in which time is of 
the essence, particularly for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR).  
The ability to conduct medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and transportation of 
supplies, such as food and water at increased speed of advance (SOA), 
drastically increases the number of people who are able to be assisted over that 
of ground units. 
The next capability that riverine forces have that makes them unique in 
stability operations is their ability to operate both on water and on land.  The 
significance of this is hard to overstate.  Other platforms, rotary wing aircraft for 
example, are also highly mobile, but have very limited ability to operate in a 
manner that focuses on putting foot-mobile forces on the ground, as a regular 
occurrence.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, land-based units are quite 
easily able to put units on the ground for missions of diverse length, but their 
mobility is limited.  Riverine forces provide a capability that offers a mix of 
mobility and access.  The current craft in use, the Riverine Patrol Boat (RPB), 
shown in Figure 1, is able to push directly onto the shoreline to unload its 
compliment of the embarked RMIO team.   
 
Figure 1.   Riverine patrol boat (From Stone, 2009) 
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The RMIO team is designed to be a specialized and highly trained 
component of the RIVRON that is able to conduct operations ashore to include 
sweep and clear, cordon and search, MEDEVAC, detainee operations, and many 
more.  One of the most effective uses of the RMIO team is as an engagement 
force.  They have the ability to operate among the population ashore, providing 
the crucial communication capability that would not be able to take place from the 
riverine craft alone.   
C. RIVERINE FORCE LIMITATIONS AND CONSTRAINTS 
1. Key Limitations 
While the U.S. Navy (USN) riverine forces do bring a unique capability to 
the joint force commander, they currently have limitations that prevent them from 
becoming as effective a unit as they could be.  The first limitation is a reduced 
capability of the RMIO team to engage the population.  One of the major 
problems that the RMIO team suffers from is that they have no way to identify the 
people they are talking to, either on other watercraft or ashore.  This, at first 
glance, seems to be fairly insignificant, but when coupled with severe language 
barriers, there exists an inability to attribute any information gathered with any 
degree of certainty.  This problem is further exacerbated when RMIO teams 
conduct repeat engagement in a given area so infrequently.  This situation 
makes collaborating information gathered during two different patrols dependant 
solely on the memory of the patrol members.  Beyond collaborating past and 
present engagement activities, there is a fundamental lack of integrity in the 
process of verifying the identity of the individual in question.  The ubiquity of 
government issued identification varies widely and the forging of government 
identification is always of concern. 
The second key limitation that the riverine forces suffer is increased risk of 
attack and reduced situational awareness, stemming from what is a limited ability 
to identify with certainty what lies beyond LOS.  This weakness stems from the 
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lack of dedicated air support for the RIVRON.  Without this level of support, both 
the riverine craft and RMIO team are vulnerable during operations.  This 
vulnerability stems from the fact that rivers, by their very nature, are in defilade.  
Always having to operate in a position that leaves a unit open to attack from 
above, with limited ability to effect direct fire, is dangerous.  To add to the danger 
of the terrain, a riverine unit only has two directions in which to travel most times, 
upstream and downstream.  Being able to travel in only two directions has two 
fundamental flaws.  First, the enemy only has two choices to affect their force 
placement decisions and second, riverines that travel upstream must follow along 
the same path to return to base.  These disadvantages in terrain make it 
extremely important that riverine forces have some additional ability to see 
beyond LOS, making it possible to avoid enemies lying in wait along the river. 
The last fundamental limitation suffered by the riverine forces is 
communication reachback capability.  During operations, there are multiple 
instances in which there is information, such as documents, photos, and maps 
that need to be sent to, and/or from HQ and the operating riverine forces.  The 
inability to send and/or receive this information severely limits the information 
with which the riverine forces are able to operate.  On the force’s side, mission 
plans and details have to be either memorized, or brought in a very vulnerable 
paper format.  While planning documents can be arranged to be brought on 
mission, there is little capability to acquire amplifying or new data to assist in 
reacting to situations as they change.  HQ suffers from the same lack of 
information coming from the operating unit.  With communications limited to voice 
only, HQ operates on periodic position reports (POSREPs) and occasional 
situation reports (SITREPs).  They have no ability to access any video, audio, or 
documents obtained by the boat or RMIO team.  This problem prevents the 
intelligence personnel with the RIVRON from being able to provide real time 
analysis, or updates based off real-time events.  Overall, the communication 
between operating forces and the HQ is extremely limited, meaning that tactical 
control of the operating force is very difficult, if not impossible to manage. 
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2. Timing 
In addition to the considerations of what mission is being conducted, 
riverine forces will be utilized only during specific phases of the operation. U.S. 
DON Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 3.06-1 (2008) states:  
Riverine forces are not manned, trained, and equipped for forcible 
entry operations or large-scale offensive and defensive operations. 
Significantly, the introduction of Navy riverine forces into a theater 
of operations requires an established forward operating base (FOB) 
or a forward logistic site, which can be land- or sea-based, from 
which to operate. 
This requirement coincides with the general status that exists in phase IV 
and phase V operations, with the possibility of existing in late phase III.  While 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (2008) does not 
specifically break out different phasing models for combat and non-combat 
operational plans (OPLANs), the model can be applied and interpreted for both 
(Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2.   Phasing model (From U.S. JCS, 2008) 
These prerequisites put into place for planners’ consideration are mutually 
supporting to the same phases that would be implemented by the majority of 
actors conducting stability operations in theater.  As Oliver (2008) describes, it is 
understood that while Major Combat Operations (MCO) are underway, in phase 
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III, most actions inherent in stability operations will be secondary in nature.  As 
Figure 3 shows, and as discussed by Oliver (2008), as phase III ends, stability 
operations will increase in size, duration, and importance.  It should be noted that 
the timing for the ending of phase III can be abrupt, so preparations for the 
stability operations that will occur in phase IV must be implemented and ramped 
up during phase III.  Case in point is the abrupt end to MCO during OIF, which 
lasted only 43 days compared to the length of the overall campaign, which ended 
in its seventh year in 2010. 
 
Figure 3.   Notional operation plan phases versus level of military effort  
(From U.S. JCS, 2008) 
3. Threat Environment 
The threat environment that riverine forces can operate in is also 
constrained.  As Figure 4 shows, threat environments are broken up into three 
levels, with level I being the least severe, and level III being the most severe. 
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Figure 4.   Levels of threat (From U.S. JCS, 2010) 
As per NTTP 3-06.1 (2008), riverine forces are authorized to operate in a 
level I and level II threat environment only.  Again, this is not prohibitive because 
most stability operations missions and tasks would not be utilized against a level 
III threat, such as a large tactical force. 
D. U.S. NAVY RIVERINE—MY EXPERIENCE ON THE RIVER4 
During his first combat patrol in Iraq, the author was speeding along Lake 
Qadisiyah at around 30 knots.  The Navy’s riverine force was not there yet in full, 
but a few members came ahead to patrol with the U.S Marines that were 
conducting the riverine mission, Dam Security Unit (DSU) Three, to learn the ins 
and outs of riverine operations on the Euphrates River.  The mission that day 
was to engage the local population of the lake, mostly fisherman, and talk to 
them about the local happenings and things they have noticed.  As the intended 
landing site, a small set of homes on the lakeshore, was approached, the patrol 
adjusted formation.  One boat each took front and rear security, while the last of 
the three boats maneuvered to insert the Ground Combat Element (GCE), which 
the Riverines would call Riverine Maritime Interdiction Operations (RMIO) teams.  
                                            
4 The following is a personal account of an actual mission the author conducted on Lake 
Qadisiyah in Al Anbar Province, Iraq in February 2007.  The purpose of this vignette is to provide 
a basis for comparison of what could be asked of riverine forces, as discussed above, to what 
current capabilities can be accomplished in the Iraqi theater of operations. 
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So far, everything seemed to be going as planned and trained.  The riverine 
forces were able to maneuver fast, were very flexible in what missions were 
undertaken, were able to land forces ashore, and were well equipped with 
machine guns, grenade launchers, and small arms. Since things were seemingly 
going so well at the landing area (Figure 5), the author began to ask some 
questions. 
 
Figure 5.   Lake Qadisiyah, Al Anbar Province, Iraq 
When the question was asked how the headquarters (HQ) element was 
able to track the boats, the author was dismayed to learn that there was only one 
working Blue Force Tracker (BFT) on the boats, so tracking of all three boats was 
impossible.  When boats without BFT were used, a standard 15-minute position 
call back was used, hardly real time.  The author assumed that it would be 
commonplace to have air support on hand during missions, but learned that air 
support was rare, utilized only for large or complex missions.  It was also 
discussed that dedicated helicopter support, when available, was limited to two to 
three hours, while dedicated fixed wing support was even shorter, about forty-five 
to seventy-five minutes.  Non-dedicated support resulted in even shorter stay 
times.  Without an ability to see beyond what could be discerned by line of sight 
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(LOS), the riverine force was exposed.  This was showcased only a few minutes 
later.  As the shoreline was approached and insertion began, two local males 
saw the boats and started walking away from the small village.  They could be 
seen walking away, but because the DSU had to take time to set security and 
insert at a point that would allow positive control of the terrain, these two 
individuals were able to “get away” while only moving at the speed of a leisurely 
stroll. 
Concerned that someone was escaping from the village that could have 
useful information, or perhaps could be a person of interest, the GCE began to 
question the local villagers.  The Marines did not know the local language well, 
and neither did the Navy riverines that would be coming soon to replace them.  
The Marines worked off flash cards and booklets, as well as heavily relied on 
interpreters who were limited in availability at best.  When the Marines were 
asked about past information that had been gathered, such as who the villagers 
were, who we were talking to, when the Marines were there last, what other units 
have talked to them, and what information they were able to provide in the past, 
the reply was that that information was not immediately available to them.  
Unfortunately, all of that information was documented in an after-action report 
(AAR) which was filed away back at base.  It seemed unwise to be without such 
information that should be immediately available in order to access, analyze, 
cross-reference, etc.  It was assumed that the Marines would at least know who 
these villagers were, but very few of them had IDs, and Iraqi IDs were easily 
forged.  Those that did go through the arduous process of obtaining IDs, usually 
left them at home, so nothing would happen to them, especially fisherman out 
making their catches on the lake.  This made for a very complicated and 
lackluster ability for the DSU to make positive identification. 
Asking about what kinds of information or results usually come from these 
encounters, it was learned that usually either no one knew anything, or 
communication broke down because of the language barrier.  It seemed that 
communication might be easier, if this process did not take as long and was not 
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so arduous.  When asked about units in Iraq bringing soccer balls and candy 
along to facilitate the engagement process, the DSU replied that usually there 
were not enough of those types of materials to bring regularly.  
As the GCE was recovered, the mission commander was informed that 
something interesting was found in one of the homes.  They were able to recover 
some jihadist literature.  This information is something that should be reported 
and transmitted to HQ right away.  Unfortunately, there was no capability to send 
a copy for analysis.  In fact, that capability did not even exist at HQ.  The 
document would have to be walked over to the adjacent battalion, before it could 
be scanned and sent for analysis.  It felt like there was a lost opportunity and that 
whatever information was on the paper, would have to be acted on days later at 
the soonest.  As the DSU pulled away from the shore to make their way back to 
base, a very fast storm blew in and struck the unit.  The possibility that a storm 
might arrive while the patrol was ongoing was not part of the mission brief.  
Additionally, the unit was not updated on that possibility during the mission, as 
real-time weather updates do not get down to the individual unit level, especially 
while out on patrol.  That seemed dangerous and, indeed, it was.  During the 
hour-long transit back to base, the DSU hit 6- to 8-foot waves and ended up 
damaging some weapons and mounts in the process, as well as suffering one 
personnel injury.  
The above vignette provides some “real life” context to what can be found 
in the Joint and Navy publications. In this case specifically, the lack of technology 
that was available to the DSU had caused possible insurgents to escape, a loss 
of situational awareness with respect to the weather, and vital information in the 
form of the jihadist literature to be unable to be transferred to those that could 
provide proper analysis. The limitations discussed previously made themselves 
readily apparent on this mission, which proved to be typical with other missions 
that were conducted by riverine forces in Iraq in 2007. 
 21
E. ADDRESSING LIMITATIONS 
The capabilities of the USN riverine forces are broad, and they present the 
joint force commander with a capable option for use in stability operations.  The 
limitations, on the other hand, prevent the riverine forces from being a force that 
is consistently chosen as a necessary capability.  These limitations 
fundamentally make the riverine force mission a more dangerous one, because 
the limitations in identification, situational awareness, and communication 
mentioned above add risk that this thesis argues is unnecessary and correctable.  
In the following three chapters, this thesis will make the argument for the 
corrections needed to reduce the risk that the riverine force is required to 
currently accept when conducting missions, specifically in the realm of stability 
operations.   
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Biometrics are a collection of technologies that enable the ability to read, 
store, and verify human characteristics in order to provide a positive 
identification.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) (2004) provides 
a more detailed definition:  
Biometric technologies are authentication techniques that rely on 
measuring and analyzing physiological or behavioral 
characteristics. Identifying an individual’s physiological 
characteristic involves measuring a part of the body, such as 
fingertips or eye irises; identifying behavioral characteristics 
involves deriving data from actions, such as speech. 
The reasons for collecting this information can vary, but essentially the 
goal is to be able to provide an ability to verify the identity of a given person by 
matching the collected information to a stored biometric profile.  These 
technologies are not limited to persons that are alive, present, or cooperative 
only.  Biometrics signatures can be obtained from persons both alive and dead, a 
classic example being fingerprints.  Being in the same location is not required for 
a voice “fingerprint” or to collect fingerprints left at a location of interest such as a 
weapons cache.  Additionally, face recognition does not require the notice or 
cooperation of the person being scanned.  According to Verett (2006), additional 
ways to obtain a biometric signature include physical biometrics such as hand 
geometry, vein mapping, and iris recognition, as well as behavioral biometrics 
such as signature and keystroke recognition. 
The second step of verifying an identity using biometrics is to compare the 
collected information against a repository of biometric signatures.  This repository 
can be local, i.e., inside or attached to the device, or remote.  The advantage of a 
local database is that the comparisons to existing profiles can happen much 
faster than by accessing a remote source.  On the other hand, a local database 
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only has a limited amount of storage, so connecting to a remote database is ideal 
if there is a large range of possibilities regarding the match.  Ultimately, all 
profiles are uploaded to the DoD Biometric Task Force (BTF) whose mission is to 
“lead DoD activities to program, integrate, and synchronize biometric 
technologies and capabilities and to operate and maintain DoD’s authoritative 
biometric database to support the National Security Strategy (Biometrics Task 
Force, 2008).” 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Current Implementation 
U.S. Navy Riverine Forces are not currently using any biometric-based 
capabilities.  Other forces currently deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan are 
using biometric systems regularly to enhance combat effectiveness.  According 
to Jennings (2009) at the DoD Biometrics Program Management Office (PMO), 
the Biometric Automated Toolset (BAT) (Figure 6) and Hand-Held Interagency 
Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) (Figure 7) are the systems most 
widely used.   
 
Figure 6.   Biometric automated toolset (BAT) (From Jennings, 2009) 
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As described by the U.S. Army (USA) and U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) 
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center (2009), biometrics technology “is applicable 
across the full spectrum of operations to achieve such effects as: stripping 
insurgent of his anonymity, separating insurgent from populace, enhancing force 
protection, and increasing confidence in host nation security forces.”  Because 
there is a multitude of advantages gained by the use of biometric technologies, 
the missions where these technologies are utilized vary widely.  The Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) (2008a) describes the seven most common 
missions in which biometric technologies were utilized in Iraq in 2008: 
 Entry control point (ECP) operations at forward operating bases 
(FOB)–to manage who had authorized access or been approved to 
work on the base. 
 Population management and control operations (included census 
operations)–to determine who should and should not be in a given 
area and overall accountability. 
 Local hire work programs–using HIIDE to validate workers on 
payday, etc. 
 Raids and other kinetic operations–to find and terminate or detain 
predetermined targets and not unnecessarily extract others not 
associated with the target folder. 
 Site Exploitation–to match insurgent biometrics left at blast or 
cache site (latent fingerprints on IED debris, etc.). 
 Detainee operations supporting custody and control–supported in 
processing, daily accountability, and release programs. 
 Actions on the objective–enrolling biometrics on personnel in event 
areas (IED / Explosively Formed Penetrator (EFP) blast sites, etc.) 
when combined with analytical processes is critical in identifying 
potentially involved parties. 
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Figure 7.   Hand-Held Interagency Identification Detection Equipment (HIIDE) 
(From Jennings, 2009) 
All of the above scenarios are likely missions that would take place within 
the context of stability operations.  Additionally, each one of the above scenarios, 
with the exception of a raid, riverine forces are currently tasked with or would be 
expected to be able to accomplish.   
2. Potential Implementation 
Riverine forces would have little trouble implementing biometric systems 
into their Table of Allowances (TOA).  To make the implementation successful, 
biometric systems would have to be procured and integrated at both the HQ and 
Detachment levels of the RIVRON.  The HQ-level entity that would utilize the 
systems would be the N-2 (Intelligence) office.  This office is responsible for 
intelligence collection, dissemination, and reporting, as well as in charge of 
detainee operations for any detainees that are brought back from riverine 
missions.  The primary uses of these systems, according to U.S. JCS JP 3-24 
(2009b), would be to obtain biometric information gathered from a detachment’s 
missions and correlate it with any larger databases that are available to 
determine what information is available about the individual.  Whether there 
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exists prior information in the database or not, the N-2 office will also have the 
opportunity to supplement the raw biometric information with tags.  Tags such as 
family identities, vehicles, location obtained, time of day, language spoken, 
known associates, and many others provide an ability to enhance the information 
gained from a single biometric scan and allow the correlation of tags to find 
commonalities between individuals in various databases at the fusion center or 
above levels. 
While most of the correlation of databases and tagging of data would take 
place at the HQ level, the initial biometric scans that make that work possible is 
done by the RMIO teams that are part of each detachment.  Since at least a 
portion of the RMIO team is included as part of every mission, and they have no 
specific duties to attend to onboard the RPB like the boat crew does, they are the 
best choice for the integration of these systems.  Additionally, all biometric scans 
will have to take place ashore, with the exception of boat-to-boat interdiction 
operations, so again, the RMIO team makes the most sense for the assignment 
of conducting scans.  As JP 3-24 (2009) describes, the most important capability 
that must be in hand for the scans to provide value is access to a database 
containing past biometric scans.  Both local and remote databases provide 
different benefits and limitations, which is mentioned above, but the most 
important aspect is to ensure that feedback is being passed as to whether the 
solution in use is meeting the needs of the RMIO in terms of scan comparison.  If 
the location where the riverine forces are operating is largely static, then local 
databases will work well, as long as they are periodically updated.  On the other 
hand, if the situation is fluid, or the operating area is large, local databases may 
not provide the capability to bring as big a comparison set as needed.  In addition 
to the database situation, RMIO teams must be prepared to take biometric scans 
in a variety of situations, to include both persons that are cooperative or non-
cooperative, alive or dead, and even situations where no person is present, such 
as a crime scene or a location in which a recent significant action (SIGACT) took 
place.  It is also important for the RMIO team to take detailed notes with respect 
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to each scan in order to facilitate accurate and detailed tagging.  This will assist 
the N-2 shop in accomplishing the overall goal that Woodward Jr. (2005) 
describes as “link an enemy combatant or similar national security threat to his 
previously used identities and past activities, particularly as they relate to 
terrorism and other crimes.”  
C. BIOMETRICS IN USE 
Biometric systems, as they become more prevalent throughout the U.S. 
military, are going to be found to be useful throughout various types of conflict 
and through the associated full range of that conflict.  For stability operations 
specifically, the use of biometrics are discussed in the following three scenarios: 
 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 Counterinsurgency 
 Government and Security Force Development 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
The U.S. JCS Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (2006) has 
delineated a number of operational capabilities that apply in stability operations.  
While operations using biometric systems are too specific a capability to be 
identified in this document, the overarching capabilities that biometrics provide 
would be a subset and are identified in Table 2. 
Objective Capability 
Deliver humanitarian assistance The ability to manage crowds of 
refugees/victims 
Conduct strategic communication The ability to broadcast U.S. and coalition 
intentions and to help the local population 
find quick survival relief. 
Table 2.   HA/DR biometrics objectives and capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
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One of the many challenges that exist in a HA/DR environment is a 
displaced population.  The severity of the displacement can vary, but the 
numbers are usually staggering and hence unwieldy.  For example, The 
Telegraph (2010) reported after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010, 400,000 Haitians 
were displaced from the capital of Port-au-Prince. Alternatively, according to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (2009), after the 2004 tsunami in 
Indonesia, nearly half a million people were displaced, many having to resort to 
fleeing to other countries.  In these very grave situations, biometrics can be used 
in multiple ways.  The DoD Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA) 
(2009) discusses this situation in the following scenario: 
The U.S. government responds to a request for help from a country 
that has experienced a catastrophic disaster. There is an 
immediate need to locate, rescue, and manage the local 
population. The host government authorizes the multinational 
response force to collect biometric samples from the civilian 
population to assist with the refugee management process. 
Identities are managed using biometrics to ensure proper 
distribution of food, medical attention and supplies, transportation, 
and the reunification of families separated during the disaster.  
Fraudulent distribution of humanitarian aid is reduced, and families 
are reunited more quickly. 
An even more unfortunate result of natural disasters, and the many other 
reasons that may cause a HA/DR crisis, is the amount of deaths that are 
suffered.  The tragedy extends itself when families are unable to find their loved 
ones or when the dead cannot be identified.  The result in Haiti after the 2010 
earthquake, as reported by Waterfield (2010), was that over 10,000 of the 
deceased were buried in mass graves every day, unidentified.  Even in the face 
of such an unimaginable situation, biometric systems are useful.  As shown in 
Figure 8, the biometric scanning of bodies before they are taken away for 
transport allows for proper identification.  This primarily aids families, as they can 
gain some closure by knowing the fate of their loved ones.  With the use of 
tagging as mentioned earlier, details important to the family, such as burial 
location, can be identified.  Secondly, biometric data will allow scientists and 
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historians who have always debated the details of disasters to have some 
definitive data regarding the aftereffects.  Data provided by the dead could prove 
important in planning for the response to future disasters, to include identifying 
logistical, transportation, and medical response requirements. 
 
Figure 8.   Fingerprints from a victim of the 2004 Tsunami are examined by a 
forensic expert in Phuket, Thailand (From Jennings & Chan, 2005) 
Navy Riverine forces play a unique role in HA/DR scenarios, because they 
are able to access different areas that are no longer accessible due to various 
reasons.  Waterways tend to change drastically during weather-induced disasters 
such as typhoons or floods.  This change presents an unplanned challenge to 
conventional land-operated forces, as they are forced to plan around new water 
obstacles.  Riverine forces are in just the opposite position: they can use these 
newly formed, and likely temporary, waterways to gain access to terrain they 
previously did not have access to.  With regard to other disasters, such as 
earthquakes or tornados, many times the waterway may be fouled by debris, 
sunken vessels, etc.  The shallow draft of riverine craft allow mostly unimpeded 
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access to these fouled areas that conventional water craft would be unable to 
operate in unrestrained, due to potential danger to the vessel. 
Both the newly accessible areas and the unimpeded access to fouled 
areas give riverine forces the advantage of population access, which is key to 
biometric operations.  This enhanced access allows riverine forces to collect 
biometric data from populations that are inaccessible to other units (Figure 9).  
While biometric collection is likely to be a secondary mission to one of search 
and rescue and displaced persons management, it is a mission that can easily be 
conducted concurrently with minimal primary mission disruption.   
 
Figure 9.   Displaced persons gather along a waterway after the  
2010 Haiti earthquake (From McNamee, 2010) 
2. Counterinsurgency 
As was the case with HA/DR, biometrics support to stability operations is 
too specific of a capability to be delineated in detail in the Military Support to 
SSTRO JOC.  Also like HA/DR, there are objectives and capabilities, shown in 
Table 3, that enable operations in which biometric systems will play a key role.   
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Objective Capability 
Establish responsive battlespace 
awareness / understanding 
The ability to tag, track, and localize hostile 
elements in all domains. 
Establish and maintain a safe, 
secure environment  
The ability to use both kinetic and non-kinetic 
means to capture and defeat 
terrorists/insurgents, often in dense urban 
environments, while minimizing collateral 
damage. 
Table 3.   Counterinsurgency biometrics objectives and capabilities  
(From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
One of the most basic tasks any combat unit has in a counterinsurgency 
environment is to go on patrol and immerse themselves amongst what is almost 
always the center of gravity, the people.  When units are able to spend time 
among the people as shown in Figure 10, the opportunity presents itself to gain 
an understanding of their concerns, issues, motivations, habits, and many other 
things. According to the COIN Center (2009), using biometric systems to 
enhance this interaction “can provide units with a better understanding of the 
populace in their areas of operations, which can guide operations to better 
secure that populace.” 
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Figure 10.   A U.S. Marine hands a local Afghan in Marja a free radio  
after inputting his data into the BAT system (From Hunt, 2010) 
Operations that are conducted at the tactical level can have very far-
reaching effects.  As discussed in the USA/USMC Counterinsurgency Center 
SITREP (2009) and mentioned above, using biometric systems as identity 
verification tools “is applicable across the full spectrum of operations to achieve 
such effects as: stripping insurgent of his anonymity, separating insurgent from 
populace, enhancing force protection, and increasing confidence in host nation 
security forces.”  Specifically, Hom (2008) describes how these effects can be 
achieved.  He says that biometric systems utilized throughout the area of 
operations “would allow for identification of individuals at any node in the network 
as well as tracking of ‘tagged’ persons as they move through the network. Thus, 
the time and space in which insurgents can exist and move undetected would 
shrink significantly.” 
An even more specialized set of capabilities that have become required 
skill sets for tactical level units is Tactical Site Exploitation (TSE), sometimes also 
called Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE).  The Center for Army Lessons Learned 
(CALL) (2008b) defines TSE as “the action taken to ensure that documents, 
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material, and personnel are identified, collected, protected, and evaluated in 
order to facilitate follow-on actions. TSE focuses on the actions taken by soldiers 
and leaders at the point of initial contact.”  There are two fundamental ways in 
which the use of biometric systems can make a TSE more productive and 
informative.  First, the TSE team will run scans on the personnel that give 
interviews about what happened at the site, or those that were involved or injured 
at the site.  This information allows these individuals to be linked or “tagged” to 
the site, which will aid in future analysis.  Even more advantageous is if one of 
these individuals scanned, were actually involved in a previous criminal/insurgent 
act, which could warrant their immediate detention.  The second way a TSE team 
can successfully utilize biometrics is by gathering latent biometrics signatures 
such as fingerprints from items at the site.  Some of this information can be 
gathered on the scene, but some will be required to be sent to a lab, in which 
further testing and data gathering can be done for further biometric exploitation 
for information such as DNA. 
Riverine forces have a unique capability to utilize biometrics in a counter-
insurgency environment.  As mentioned above, conducting patrols is the 
essential ingredient to learning the fundamental understanding about how the 
population operates and conducts themselves.  Riverine forces have the unique 
ability to patrol along a travel and economic pathway that few other units can, the 
waterways.  This allows riverines to have sole access to the population that 
travels and trades along the routes afforded by the waterways.  The waterway is 
an essential element of the “human terrain.”  With riverine forces operating and 
collecting biometric data in these locations, the data can connect persons who 
would otherwise be considered disparate, making analysis much easier and 
more comprehensive.  Hom (2008) argues this point as he says to make 
“biometric profiling and tracking ubiquitous,” there must be “adequate resources” 
to cover the extent of the operating area, which for many parts of the world, 
include waterways, making riverine forces the crucial capability to fill the gap that 
would otherwise exist.  Additionally, as the waterways are unlikely to be as well 
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secured through the use of checkpoints and crossings like roadways will, these 
routes of travel offer a more enticing path for those wishing to not be detected by 
the more numerous land forces.  This access to the terrain, both physical and 
human, that other forces have difficulty accessing, also allows for TSE to be 
conducted by riverine forces in the locations.  The key capability that riverine 
forces offer is not only being able to conduct TSE on locations they identify or are 
tasked with, but also to assist other units.  Many ground units may not travel with 
a TSE capability, and for those operating near waterways, riverine forces many 
times are able to assist adjacent units by conducting TSE, while security is set 
and maintained by the ground unit. 
3. Government and Security Force Development 
A unit conducting stability operations is likely to have to conduct 
government and security force development.  According to the U.S. JCS Military 
Support to SSTRO Joint Operating Concept (JOC) (2006), there are two required 
operational capabilities where the use of biometric systems would be a force 
multiplier when conducting this type of development (Table 4).   
Objective Capability 
Establish a representative, 
effective government and the rule 
of law 
The ability to assist in the organization and 
training of personnel to work in the various 
government ministries and agencies. 
Establish and maintain a safe, 
secure environment  
The ability for the U.S. Armed Forces to train, 
equip, and advise large number of foreign 
forces in the full range of SSTR-related skills. 
Table 4.   Government and security force development biometrics objectives and 
capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
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Government development is a challenge that requires a two-pronged 
approach.  First, there must be steady advances in the capacity and capability of 
the government in the tasks that they, and the United States or coalition force are 
trying to accomplish.  At the same time, the population must be gaining 
confidence in the government’s ability to do these tasks.  The use of biometric 
systems can provide a technical capability that works hand-in-hand with the 
knowledge and experience capabilities that are being concurrently developed.  
There are many different functions that the government executes, that will be 
greatly enhanced by the use of biometrics that include identification card issue 
and verification, background checks, voting, and the conducting of a census.  As 
described by the USA/USMC COIN Center (2009), the underlying capability that 
makes the ability to conduct all of the above functions properly, is a centralized 
biometric database that the government can use to input and verify biometric 
signatures.  Hom (2008) makes it clear that the result of a central biometric 
database and a government that is executing their inherent functions in a 
dependable and reliable manner is “stability.” 
Like government development, security force development requires the 
same two-pronged approach of not only competency of operations and functions, 
but of confidence of the population as well.  In general, the security forces can be 
examined in two separate, but very similar ways, the internal or population 
security forces, made up of the police, and the external or national security 
forces, which consist of the armed forces with a land, air, and maritime 
component.  While the overall mission of these organizations can vary widely, 
fundamentally they must do many of the same things, such as recruit, train, 
retain forces, detain criminals or opposition forces, and enforce access to 
locations such as roads, bases, buildings, airports, ports of entry, etc.  These 
functions lend themselves very well to the leveraging of biometric systems to 
make them more capable at conducting these missions in an accurate manner.  
As the CALL (2008a) describes, the use of biometrics in Iraq has been very 
effective at ensuring that police candidates are fully vetted before being brought 
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into the police force.  In Afghanistan, the pre-vetting of police and army personnel 
plays a large role in both preventing and resolving problems with retention.  Any 
force member who decides to abandon their position knows that any time in the 
future that they are subjected to a biometric scan, they would be identified 
immediately, resulting in their detention, and with their absence being resolved 
by their original unit, once they are returned. 
Riverine forces are uniquely able to assist in both government and 
security force development.  As mentioned above, the riverine’s access to terrain 
inaccessible by conventional forces is one of the most advantageous reasons 
such a role is needed.  In this case though, it is not the riverine force’s role to 
conduct the functions and activities themselves, but training and assisting the 
government and security forces on how best to execute.  As Paquin (2009) 
states, this has already been successful during the U.S. Naval Mission in 
Colombia in which the Colombian Navy and Colombian Coast Guard have 
received extensive training on maritime interdiction and law enforcement.  
Specific to the biometric system capabilities the government would be looking to 
be utilized as mentioned above, the leveraging of riverine forces would be an 
excellent way to provide government services to those that use the waterways as 
their main thoroughfare, and may not have the needed access to the main city 
centers where most government services are offered.  Additionally, any maritime 
specific government services, such as boat or fishing licensing, would be greatly 
enhanced by riverine force access.  On the security force development front, 
there is always a need to maintain security on the waterways, especially as it can 
act as a main thoroughfare for those wishing to avoid traditional roadway 
checkpoints.  Additionally, trafficking of illegal drugs, weapons, or persons is very 
likely to happen along a waterway.  Training the security force, as shown in 
Figure 11, that would conduct the enforcement of laws on the waterways, and in 
the process of enforcing these laws utilizing biometrics to enhance their 
capability to do so, is a prime example of where riverine force use provides a unit 
that is able to conduct the mission where many others cannot. 
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Figure 11.   An Iraqi Solider assigned to Iraqi Riverine Police Force during special 
boat maneuvers and weapon handling training (From Aho, 2006) 
D. CONCLUSION 
The use of biometric systems has extensive capabilities that can be used 
in a variety of situations that are likely to present themselves in the near future, 
as the United States takes on larger stability operations missions.  The 
capabilities gained by the implementation and use of this specific set of systems 
is significant, from a cost perspective, when compared with costs associated with 
major weapons platforms.  The most important part of the use of biometric 
systems is that it gives you more information on which to base decisions. 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the various ways riverine forces can 
leverage unmanned platforms in support of stability operations to achieve 
situational awareness over the battlefield, facilitate command and control, and 
collect data for analysis. 
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IV. UNMANNED SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
An unmanned system is a broad term that encompasses many different 
types of systems.  The most prevalent in the U.S. military currently are the 
Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV), and 
Unmanned Maritime System (UMS).  UMS is made up of both Unmanned 
Undersea Vehicles (UUV) and Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USV).  According to 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (2005), what makes unmanned 
systems advantageous is that they specialize in the “dull, dirty, and dangerous.”  
Dull tasks are those that require lengthy on-station time or a constant state of 
alertness.  Those tasks that are dirty are ones in which it might be politically 
sensitive to send in manned vehicles, or might require sampling of hazardous 
materials.  Lastly, dangerous tasks also include those associated where a 
potential loss of life is high, like extended hostile action or flying into a hurricane. 
The increasing requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) include the incorporation of numerous sensors.  
Unmanned systems are becoming more widespread, as the traditional missions 
of manned scouting and reconnaissance have been unable to keep pace with the 
information demands of commanders.  As stated in the OSD (2005) Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems Roadmap: “The dominant requirement for sensing is for: 
1. Imaging (visible, infrared, and radar) 
2. Signals (for the Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) and Suppression of 
Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) missions) 
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (chemical, biological, 
radiological [CBR]) 
4. Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) 





In recent years, the use of unmanned systems has been expanded to 
include missions conducting offensive operations.  Although this is a proven 
capability that will continue to become ubiquitous in unmanned systems, it will 
not be discussed as part of this thesis. 
The use of unmanned systems follows a predictable path of the following 
steps: 
1. Launch 
2. Operation and Collection 
3. Recovery 
The logistics of launching and recovery are very important, especially for 
riverine operations.  The remainder of this chapter will focus mostly on collection 
and the missions in which specific collection goals are laid out, but the 
challenges associated with launching and recovery should not be forsaken. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Current Implementation 
When the U.S. Navy stood up Riverine Group One and active riverine 
squadrons were also commissioned in 2006, unmanned systems were a 
capability that was integrated in planning, but training, logistics, and exercising 
were not existent during pre-deployment preparations, limiting their success.  
The extent of the unmanned systems that were fielded only consisted of one type 
of UAS, the Silver Fox, with no UGV or UMS on the horizon.  While the Silver 
Fox UAS, as shown in Figure 12, had potential, there were two fundamental 
problems:  First, the squadron had difficulty integrating UAS operations with boat 
operations during the training cycle for deployment.  As Captain Michael Jordan, 
the Commodore for Riverine Group One, described, “We have a few folks trained 
to use them, but we need to get better at that.  It’s a key asset we need to be 
utilizing better (Faram, 2008).”  The second problem was a reduction of the 
effective range due to electromagnetic interference in the operating area, which 
was discovered by RIVRON 1 after multiple vehicles were lost.  Due to the 
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numerous amounts of electromagnetic countermeasures used to combat the IED 
threat in theater, there exists a significant amount of electronic pollution.  As 
Hodge (2009) from Wired reported, Commander William Guarini, Commanding 
Officer of Riverine Squadron One, described the Silver Fox as “very susceptible” 
to this interference.  This same problem presented itself when operating in 
vicinity of the Haditha Dam in Iraq, with the dam producing its own 
electromagnetic interference, causing the same effect on the drone. 
 
Figure 12.   Silver Fox UAS (From Office of Naval Research, 2009) 
While there were other UAS in consideration, to include the Wasp UAS, to 
supplement or replace the plagued Silver Fox platform, Wilson (2009), from the 
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OPNAV) N851, concluded that NECC 
would wait for the Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System (STUAS) Tier II to 
become available.  This will take some time though, as it was recently 
announced by Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) (2010) on July 29, 2010 
that the contract for STUAS Tier II was awarded to Insitu Incorporated.  Insitu 
(2010) announced following the award that Initial Operational Capability (IOC) is 
expected by the fourth quarter of Fiscal Year (FY) 2013. 
Riverine forces, of course, have not been alone in the quest to expand 
capability by utilizing unmanned systems.  In fact, in Table 5, the FY 2009–2034 
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Unmanned System Integrated Roadmap describes the numerous different 
unmanned systems that are filling the requirements of nine specific Joint 
Capability Areas5 (JCA). 
 
 
Table 5.   Density of named systems within each JCA (From OSD, 2009) 
In JP 3-24, the U.S. JCS (2009b) argues passionately for unmanned 
systems, saying their use strengthens local intelligence, enhances regional and 
national reporting, and bolsters operations at all levels.”  Because there are a 
multitude of advantages gained by the use of unmanned systems, the missions 
where they are utilized vary widely.  The following, from OSD (2005), is a list of 
the top fifteen missions for ISR assets ranked by importance by Combatant 
Commanders and Service Chiefs in 2004: 
1. Reconnaissance 
2. Precision Target Location and Designation 
3. Signals Intel 
4. Communications/Data Relay 
5. Battle Management 
6. Chem/Bio Reconnaissance 
7. Counter Cam/Con/Deception 
8. Combat SAR 
                                            
5 Joint Capability Areas (JCA) are collections of like DoD capabilities functionally grouped to 
support capability analysis, strategy development, investment decision making, capability portfolio 




10. Electronic Warfare 
11. Information Warfare 
12. Mine Detection/CM 
13. Digital Mapping 
14. Covert Sensor Insertion 
15. SOF Team Resupply 
All of the above missions are likely to take place within the context of 
stability operations.  Additionally, each one of the above missions, with the 
exception of a battle management and strike, riverine forces are currently tasked 
with, or would be expected to be able to accomplish, at least in a limited manner. 
2. Potential Implementation 
The use of unmanned systems as part of the Navy Riverine Forces was 
planned from its inception.  As reported by Signal (Ackerman, 2007), Captain 
Dave Balk, the assistant chief of staff for strategy and new technology at the 
Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) said, “the goal is a three-
dimensional unmanned vehicle presence that employs aerial, surface and 
underwater vehicles to improve riverine situational awareness.”  To make this 
goal a reality for today’s forces, specific integration must be addressed. 
For unmanned systems to be successful in RIVRONs, they must be 
integrated into both the HQ and detachment sections of the squadron.  The 
squadron personnel that are assigned as unmanned system operators will need 
to work closely with both the intelligence (N-2) and operations (N-3) portions of 
the headquarters element.  For most seamless employment, they should be 
assigned to the operations section to ensue that their use was based on 
operational need.  One reason that unmanned system detachments have not 
been entirely successful is because the personnel making up the detachment are 
still completing training and schools at the same time as the boat crews and 
RMIO teams.  The remaining time between training schools and deployment 
does not provide an adequate opportunity for squadron or detachment personnel 
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to integrate, train, and rehearse employment tactics to the point where the 
integration of assets; boats, personnel and unmanned systems becomes 
seamless.   
While the operations department handles tactical employment of the 
unmanned system detachment within boat detachments, the N-2 (Intelligence) 
department is responsible for the collection and analysis of the data captured.  
While any data captured by the unmanned system is immensely helpful during 
operations on the ground, many times the most useful data is found when 
analysis is done after operations are complete.  This time allows for the 
intelligence specialists assigned to the N-2 office to catalog, tag, assess, and 
report on what data was captured by the unmanned system.  This reporting is 
crucial, as it allows key data to be shared with adjacent units that operate in the 
same area as well as up to higher echelon intelligence organizations such as 
fusion cells. 
For actual operations, the unmanned systems detachment must be 
assigned to a riverine boat detachment.  This ensures UAS planning is 
conducted in conjunction with the squadron N-3.  During operations, the 
unmanned systems detachment would be under tactical control of the Officer in 
Charge (OIC).  Any specific requests for information (RFI) would be incorporated 
into the pre-mission planning and therefore become an integral part of the 
operation. 
The missions for which unmanned systems are sought are expansive.  As 
Russo (2006) describes, “in riverine operations, one of the keys to success is 
having as much situational awareness as possible.”  While there may be 
numerous other missions the riverine forces will actively use unmanned systems 
for, situational awareness will be a major part of each mission and the primary 
tasking for all unmanned systems.  Similarly, Spangler (1995) portrays dedicated 
helicopter support in support of riverine operations during the Vietnam conflict, as 
the same capability unmanned systems can provide to increase “ambush 
resistance, airborne observation, and early warning.”  This capability is especially 
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important when riverine forces have placed RMIO teams ashore.  Having 
unmanned systems available, especially UAS in this case, allows RMIO teams to 
be forewarned of enemy activity and potential ambush sites, as well as allowing 
them to much more easily identify helicopter landing zones (HLZ) in case a 
MEDEVAC is necessary or spot alternate extraction points along the river in case 
emergency extraction is needed.   
One often-overlooked portion of riverine operations is the waterborne 
guard post (WBGP).  As depicted by the Riverine Operations NTTP (U.S. DON, 
2008), the WBGP is how riverine forces conduct static surveillance.  The purpose 
of a WBGP is for the riverine force to be still and as hidden as much as possible 
to prevent them from being seen.  While the WBGP has its advantages, not 
being able to transit the waterway limits the field of view drastically.  The use of 
unmanned systems in conjunction with a WBGP allows the riverine forces to 
multiply the amount of terrain they are able to monitor while remaining 
undetected.  The WBGP and bivouacking, i.e., staying in a temporary camp in an 
unsheltered area, are also two instances where riverine forces are vulnerable to 
attack.  Riverine forces will need to bivouac away from their base of operations 
as mission requirements require, and having an unmanned systems provide 
security over-watch can mitigate risk by providing an effective layer of security to 
prevent an ambush.   
C. UNMANNED SYSTEMS IN USE 
Unmanned systems, as they become more prevalent throughout the U.S. 
military, are going to be found to be useful throughout various types of conflict 
and through the associated full range of that conflict.  For stability operations 
specifically, the use of unmanned systems are discussed in the following three 
scenarios: 
 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 Counterinsurgency 
 Government and Security Force Development 
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1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
Functional and operational capabilities that apply in stability operations are 
described in the DoD Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) Joint Operating Concept (JOC).  While this 
document does not discuss unmanned systems specifically, the capabilities 
required for stability operations, shown in Table 6, include unmanned systems as 
they would play a large role in improving the overall effectiveness of the 
operation.   
Objective Capability 
Deliver humanitarian assistance The ability to coordinate and integrate with 
U.S. government (USG) agencies and 
multinational organizations in order to 
support humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response efforts. 
Establish responsive battlespace 
awareness / understanding 
The ability to conduct persistent surveillance 
of critical enemy activities in difficult and 
denied areas by using sensors to capture 
timely, relevant, and interoperable source 
data.6 
Table 6.   HA/DR unmanned systems objectives and capabilities  
(From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
One of the many challenges that HA/DR missions present is that getting 
access to locations where initial aid and assistance, such as search and rescue, 
where it is needed can be very difficult.  Even more challenging, is finding out 
where the focus of effort needs to be without area access, which can make the 
first steps in the execution of HA/DR operations unsure or misguided.  The 
                                            
6 In HA/DR, this persistence surveillance would not be limited to only enemy activities, but 
expanded to all critical activities. 
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author observed this first hand during the HA/DR operations following Hurricane 
Katrina’s landfall in New Orleans, Louisiana in 2005 (Figure 13).   
Even though forces had been on site for many days prior to the 
author’s arrival on USS TORTUGA eight days after the storm, on 
the first day of operations there were over fifty people that were in 
very apparent need of rescue that had not been reached because 
there was no access to the 9th ward of New Orleans at that time 
due to flooding and road damage. 
Unmanned systems are able to play crucial roles in HA/DR situations like 
the one mentioned.  Instead of only operating where it was apparent that 
accessibility was possible, by using the sensors of unmanned assets, it would be 
possible to precisely direct operations to where recovery assets are needed 
most.  Also crucial to effective HA/DR is quickly determining what additional 
assets are needed to facilitate the response.  Unmanned assets can quickly 
provide significant details regarding various different aspects of the same event, 
providing valued situational awareness to the responding entity, while at the 
same time, as Duhan (2005) describes, reducing the number of manned aircraft 





Figure 13.   Mark Scovill, Commanding Officer, USS TORTUGA (LSD-46) surveys  
the extent of flooding in the 9th Ward, New Orleans, LA, after  
Hurricane Katrina (From Watkins, 2005) 
An additional challenge that poses itself during HA/DR operations is 
assessing the condition of the affected area.  This is vitally important for 
response organizations to know, as gaining a comprehensive understanding of 
the various roadways, waterways, bridges, ports, airfields, etc. will facilitate a 
much greater speed of response.  Ryan (2007) explains that organizations that 
respond to HA/DR scenarios are likely to be more mobile.  These more mobile 
organizations are going to be able to deploy personnel and equipment to disaster 
zones much more quickly than in previous HA/DR scenarios.  To facilitate their 
much more expedient arrival and provide them the information they need to get 
their assets into the field more quickly, the use of unmanned systems is an 
obvious choice.  The U.S. JCS (2008) argues that utilizing ISR assets in this way 
“decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and 
tempo of operations.”  The importance of understanding the environment to 
facilitate effective timing and tempo of operations was put onto display clearly 
after the earthquake in Haiti in 2010.  As Snow, Harris, and Adhikari from ABC 
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News (2010) reported, there was a massive back-up of relief supplies stuck at 
the airport with little understanding of where or why the bottlenecks were taking 
place, while meanwhile millions of desperate Haitians suffered without.  Using 
unmanned systems in this instance could have provided the data needed to map, 
track, and understand the movements of supplies, allowing the response forces 
to direct assets to correcting the bottlenecks and getting aid to those that needed 
it most. 
Using riverine forces equipped with an unmanned system capability would 
be a significant step forward in gaining tactical situational awareness when 
executing a HA/DR operation.  Riverine forces’ ability to maneuver along the 
waterways, where no infrastructure is needed, allows them to be a first on the 
scene type of unit.  This early access to a disaster area with unmanned systems 
capability gives the scene commander an early assessment as to where the 
focus of operations needs to be and what further assets are needed to complete 
those operations.  Being able to provide ISR data gathered by riverine forces 
gives the commander an immediate advantage in developing the strategic plan 
for the military forces assisting in the HA/DR operations.  
2. Counterinsurgency 
Both functional and operational capabilities needed in a counterinsurgency 
environment are discussed in detail in the DoD Military Support to SSTRO JOC 
(2006).  While unmanned systems are not specifically broken out, there are 
specific capabilities, shown in Table 7, in which unmanned systems could play a 







Establish responsive battlespace 
awareness / understanding 
The ability to conduct persistent surveillance 
of critical enemy activities in difficult and 
denied areas by using sensors to capture 
timely, relevant, and interoperable source 
data 
Establish and maintain a safe, 
secure environment  
The ability to use both kinetic and non-kinetic 
means to capture and defeat 
terrorists/insurgents, often in dense urban 
environments, while minimizing collateral 
damage. 
Table 7.   Counterinsurgency unmanned systems objectives and capabilities  
(From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
Counterinsurgency is defined by the JCS (2001) as “those political, 
economic, military, paramilitary, psychological, and civic actions taken by a 
government to defeat an insurgency.”  Fundamentally, counterinsurgency is a 
battle for the support of the people.  The population is so important because as 
Tomes (2004) depicts, something as simple as having consistent engagement 
with the population and “anticipating problems and proactively addressing them 
leaves the insurgent without causes to exploit.”  Critical to winning this support of 
the people is being able to operate outside of large bases and protected areas.  
As Cohen, Crane, Horvath, and Nagl (2006) describe, this highlights one of the 
many paradoxes of counterinsurgency that “the more you protect your force, the 
less secure you are.”  Stavroulakis (2006) lays out that to be able to venture out 
of these zones of protection and be effective at the assigned counterinsurgency 
mission, “maximum situational awareness” is one of many essential goals.  
Situational awareness not only allows you to have a greater ability to protect 
yourself while conducting combat missions, it also provides the information 
needed to conduct offensive operations.  Unmanned systems present a 
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capability that is a force multiplier in support of all of these objectives.  
Unmanned systems’ primary mission is ISR by definition, which can be used both 
defensively and offensively.  Defensively, unmanned systems allow for a greater 
understanding of the operational area and can be instrumental to formulating a 
common operational picture, one of the key pieces of information needed to 
prevent fratricide or “blue-on-blue” engagements.  Offensively, (unarmed) 
unmanned systems can provide four of the five pieces of necessary information 
needed for successful target engagement as part of the “Kill Chain” presented in 
Figure 14 by Beaver, Mercado, Bucher, Free, Byers, and Oliveria (2006). 
 
 
Figure 14.   Functional Flow of the Kill Chain (From Beaver et al., 2006) 
Another challenge in a counterinsurgency environment is that insurgents 
tend to blend in with the people, making distinguishing friend and foe more 
difficult.  This is a very difficult challenge to overcome and as Cassidy (2004) 
says: “It underscores the importance of aggressive patrolling, population security, 
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and the denial of sanctuary to the insurgents.”  Preventing insurgents from 
having a sanctuary to conduct their own operations means that they must not feel 
comfortable enough to conduct their operations “in plain sight.”  As the situation 
for the counterinsurgent improves, the ability for the insurgent to operate with 
impunity decreases, requiring a much more comprehensive and ubiquitous 
presence of ISR.  Unmanned systems present the opportunity to gain this 
increase in ISR capability, while allowing combat forces to focus on population-
centered operations.  Additionally, due to the ability for unmanned systems to 
stay on station for long periods of time beyond what conventional combat forces 
could accomplish, they are ideal, as Flynn, Pottinger, and Batchelor (2010) 
suggest, to be “tasked with scanning the countryside around the clock in the 
hope of spotting insurgents burying bombs or setting up ambushes.”  While 
single events such as these can give the counterinsurgent forces a specific 
location to avoid or to prosecute, sometimes more advantageous information is 
gained by the long-term tracking and collection of insurgent activities.  As the 
author observed in Iraq, “regional level UAS were very successful in providing 
information regarding insurgent activity times, locations, and paths, allowing for 
the development of an intelligence picture that could be exploited at the most 
opportune moment.”  This type of long-term presence and data collections could 
not be accomplished by manned assets without orders of magnitude more cost 
and resources compared to the utilization of unmanned assets. 
Riverine forces have already proven themselves in counterinsurgency 
conflict both in Vietnam and Iraq, and with the addition of an effective unmanned 
systems capability; they make themselves an even more effective force.  Having 
the additional situational awareness that unmanned systems provide allows 
riverine forces to operate more often and for longer periods of time, thus 
drastically increasing the amount of time they can spend interacting with the 
populace.  Unmanned systems are not only useful indentifying possible insurgent 
activity that may pose a risk, but, as Benbow et al. (2006) lays out, they are also 
useful in identifying water-borne IED threats, which pose as much of a hazard to 
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riverine forces as they do to the population that uses the waterway for 
commerce.  There is no questioning that the riverine operational area is dynamic, 
where water, land, and air units all intermix.  As Spangler (1995) identified, to be 
successful in this environment requires “close coordination and integration of all 
assets.”  He argues that riverine forces needs “high tech sensors,” which 
unmanned systems can provide.  Stolzenburg (2008) expounds on the use of 
sensors during OIF where riverine forces took positions to provide overwatch on 
avenues of approach that could be used by insurgents to disrupt ongoing 
operations.  Coupling these routine operations with unmanned systems would 
give both the riverine forces and the adjacent units they are protecting much 
more forewarning of possible insurgent activity, preventing surprise, and in some 
scenarios, facilitating counterattacks to take place. 
3. Government and Security Force Development 
The task of government and security force development plays a key role in 
stability operations.  Unmanned systems can assist in this development and 
foster legitimacy in the process.  The DoD Military Support to SSTRO Joint 
Operating Concept (JOC) (2006) lays out operational capabilities in which 
unmanned systems would play a role in development (Table 8).  
Objective Capability 
Establish a representative, 
effective government and the rule 
of law 
The ability to assist in the organization and 
training of personnel to work in the various 
government ministries and agencies. 
Establish and maintain a safe, 
secure environment  
The ability for the U.S. Armed Forces to train, 
equip, and advise large number of foreign 
forces in the full range of SSTR-related skills. 
Table 8.   Government and security force development unmanned systems 
objectives and capabilities (From U.S. JCS, 2006) 
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For the people of a nation to believe in their government, they must see 
their presence and feel like the government is providing a service, fostering 
legitimacy in the process.  For budding governments to which the United States 
is providing support during stability operations, this can be an uphill task.  But, as 
Flynn et al. (2010) describe, “governance, development, and local populations 
[are] all topics that must be understood in order to prevail.”  There are key 
opportunities for success as government personnel have the opportunity to visit 
local communities to conduct project assessments and meet with local leaders.  
These local leaders will have a comprehensive understanding of what the 
government can and cannot  do to help their community.  One issue that arises is 
that as more engagement and fact-finding is done on the ground, this new 
information only creates significantly more work for the government.  This is 
where unmanned systems can play a role; governments can collect for example 
air quality testing, crop data analysis (Figure 15), analysis of road and traffic 
conditions, etc.; utilizing unmanned assets provides an opportunity for 
government officials to spend more time with community leaders instead of out 
gathering data.  As annotated in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 
(Rumsfeld, 2006), these unmanned systems can provide a crucial capability to 
the government to include “automation, integration, analysis, and distribution of 
information,” all keys to effective governance in the 21st century. 
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Figure 15.   Crop Analysis with imagery provided by UAV (From Volger, 2006) 
To enable the government growth in both capability and capacity requires 
a security situation that is conducive.  To create this environment of security and 
enable the possibility of economic and societal growth is why in the QDR, 
Rumsfeld (2006) argues for a strong capability for countries to be “policing 
themselves.”  This does not happen automatically though, and hence is why 
security force development is such an integral part of stability operations.  The 
key to successful security force operations is an innate understanding of the 
normal conditions of the area of operations, and what Freitas and Treadway 
(1994) describe as “vital information.”  Such information that U.S. forces can 
pass on to growing local security forces that can grow this understanding are an 
identification and analysis of actions taking place in prohibited areas, 
unauthorized times, or differing from normal patterns.  While these tasks seem 
simple enough, having enough security forces on the ground to accomplish an 
ubiquitous understanding is challenging, especially in a stability operations 
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environment where the focus is likely on growth.  Hedderly (2008) argues that the 
addition of advanced technologies can ease the “manpower burden” that would 
naturally exist in this situation.  To accomplish these ends, the equipping of 
security forces that are being trained and professionalized with unmanned 
systems would provide an immediate capability that would make up for any 
personnel shortage that may exist, while at the same time, providing information 
that can be appropriately stored, cataloged, and mined to accomplish a greater 
understanding of the operating environment.  Ferebee (2009) argues this quite 
succinctly: 
The ability to tag and track personnel and vessels regardless of 
size and location will greatly enhance situational awareness for 
everyone. Not only does electronic tracking offer increased security 
for personnel, it alleviates the need to exhaust resources for simple 
monitoring activities and provides the ability to coordinate 
interception efforts. 
Riverine forces, equipped with unmanned systems, could provide an 
excellent opportunity to execute government and security force development 
missions.  As mentioned, government presence is the first step to legitimacy as it 
grows.  General Speer (2002) argues that like during operations in Colombia, 
riverine forces providing assistance on developing a government presence along 
the waterways allows the “government to exercise sovereignty throughout the 
vast regions where other governmental entities are otherwise absent.”  These 
areas where riverine forces can provide capability coincide with the areas where 
government presence is needed.  Opportunities for riverine forces to offer 
assistance in government development by way of unmanned systems include, 
assessing waterway conditions for fishing or building of ports, investigating dam 
or irrigation infrastructure, and many others.  Related to security force 
development missions, using riverine forces would be at even more of an 
advantage.  The instructing of foreign waterborne forces has been a staple 
mission of the riverine force for decades argues Paquin (2009), especially in 
Colombia.  LaFranchi (2001) lays out that when waterways make up such an 
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important part of a country’s lifeblood of travel and commerce, “officials see 
controlling inland waterways as tantamount to establishing an orderly state 
presence in large swatches of the country.”  Crucial to security forces being as 
effective as possible at understanding and controlling the waterways are the 
ability to expand situational awareness, especially air platforms.  As JP 3-24 
(U.S. JCS, 2009b) describes: “Airpower capability is a catalyst for government 
legitimacy, projecting national sovereignty, and accelerating the nation’s overall 
internal stability as well as regional security.”  While airpower historically has 
never been started with unmanned systems, there is no reason that unmanned 
systems cannot be leveraged to build the beginning of an airpower capability.  JP 
3-24 goes on to argue that one mission for maritime security forces is to 
“introduce or expand existing maritime domain awareness efforts” and additional 
missions “may include fishery patrols, interior security, port authority, customs, 
and immigration.”  For each of these maritime domain missions, a riverine force, 
providing security assistance and equipped with advanced unmanned systems 
technology, would multiply the return on investment through expanded capability.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The integration of unmanned systems into the USN Riverine Force is a 
much easier task since it has already been attempted.  The Silver Fox UAS was 
a noble attempt to expand riverine force capability at the onset, but now the 
lessons learned from the experiment need to be applied with the forthcoming 
Small Tactical Unmanned Aircraft System as well as the other non-aerial 
unmanned systems that should follow.  The unmanned systems comprised of 
UAS, UMS, and UUV, if implemented, would play a key role in the stability 
operations.  Future riverine forces will need to support the realms of ISR, 
situational awareness, persistent tracking, as well as battlefield coordination that 
are all made possible by unmanned systems.   
In this chapter, we discussed how unmanned systems detailed to riverine 
forces could gather immense amounts of information that could be used by 
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various stakeholders to accomplish the plethora of missions that stability 
operations demand.  Chapter V will break ground on the topic of information 
sharing.  Information sharing is the key to making the data gathered by biometric 
systems, unmanned systems, or any other advanced information gathering 
technology work for the joint force commander, by making the data available in a 
timely and targeted fashion. 
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V. INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Information sharing is how modern forces are able to enhance their 
decision making at all levels.  As one would expect, better decisions are 
consistently made when those who need it receive more accurate and timely 
information.  The DoD (2007) defines information sharing as: 
Making information available to participants (people, processes, or 
systems). Information sharing includes the cultural, managerial, and 
technical behaviors by which one participant leverages information 
held or created by another participant. 
Information sharing is a concept that is a fairly new addition in doctrine, 
gaining in regular use starting in 2000 with Joint Vision 2020.  Even though this is 
the case, information sharing has been a requirement and a precursor for 
successful operations throughout history.  Information sharing currently 
enhances each tenet of the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, 










C4I Tenet Information Sharing Enhancement 
Command and 
Control 
Allows the commander to make more effective decisions in 
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and 
operations by having better information available. 
Communications Expands the use of communications beyond voice.  
Information sharing leverages other media and data sources 
such as live or captured video, biometric data, historical 
analysis, and many others. 
Computers Puts computers capable of capturing, sharing, and receiving 
various media into the hands of those operating at the front 
line of conflict, where information is simultaneously most rich 
for collection and most immediately usable. 
Intelligence Information sharing gets more information in the hands of 
intelligence professionals for analysis.  Furthermore, this 
additional analysis is also more easily shared back to the 
originator and other stakeholders. 
Table 9.   Information sharing enhances the concepts of C4I 
It is important to understand that breakdowns in information sharing such 
as those regarding the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, have led to the execution of new strategic guidance and 
emerging technological capabilities, however it is only after a disaster these 
shortfalls are realized.  After 9/11, the national storyline was dominated by asking 
why the government could not “connect the dots” to prevent the attack, and after 
Hurricane Katrina, the government was questioned by the mainstream media as 
to why various departments and agencies were unable to coherently work 
together during the response.  These failures are reminders of the associated 
consequences of not sharing information, and when used as examples in concert 
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with the gains that could be made with implementation, present a compelling 
storyline to incite action towards greater government-wide information sharing. 
The 9/11 attacks were the catalyst that caused the substantial changes in 
the intelligence community.  Once the intelligence community became focused 
on information sharing, it was realized that there were not enough assets to 
handle all of the collection and analysis required.  This realization spread into the 
military intelligence community and it was quickly realized that all forces could 
operate as collection assets as long as they were given the proper tools.  When 
all forces started reporting intelligence in droves during OIF, fusion centers were 
created.  Acting as hubs for collection information, these fusion centers were able 
to effectively catalog and analyze the incoming data.  These fusion centers were 
then able to export various intelligence products to decision makers as well as 
directly feed timely intelligence to special operations forces.  The fusion centers 
would not be successful, however, if there was not a myriad of forces on the 
ground conducting collection activities and subsequently sharing them. 
B. IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Current Implementation 
Current U.S. Navy Riverine Forces only have a limited number of systems 
available that could be used for information sharing.  The best system that is 
currently in use is the Blue Force Tracker (BFT).  The BFT, along with a Global 
Positioning System (GPS) device, allows for the continuous broadcasting of the 
current position to other forces through the BFT system.  BFT is equipped with 
integrated maps that overlay other units’ positions, creating a mobile operational 
picture.  BFT also has the capability for broadcasting messages such as text 
messages or standard reports, allowing units to communicate in near real time. 
During the stand-up of Riverine Squadron One, the RPBs that were received 
from the USMC had only a few boats equipped with working BFT.  Beginning in 
2007, the U.S. Navy started equipping boats with upgraded communications gear 
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by adding BFT to all boats and replacing the existing radio with the PRC-117F 
pictured in Figure 16.  Even though the PRC-117F was an upgrade, its advanced 
capabilities such as sending data were not taken advantage of and were left 
unused. 
 
Figure 16.   Harris AN/PRC-117F Radio (From Olive-drab.com, 2010) 
The HQ element of the riverine squadrons also received the PRC-117F 
radio in order to maintain voice communications with operating forces, but did not 
receive BFT capabilities.  This oversight resulted in a severely degraded 
capability, preventing the HQ element from executing command and control 
operation of riverine forces in near real time. The limited number of platforms 
available to conduct information sharing within the riverine squadrons, while new, 
are a result of requirements development that are not in line with the information 
sharing needs of the force.  Because information sharing was mistakenly not a 
planned requirement for riverine forces, the ability to accomplish effective 
information sharing has been largely ineffective.  Galli et al. (2007) argues that 
the original requirements only supported a narrow view of what a 
communications system should do.  They also succinctly lay out that:  
The communications equipment in use by the riverine forces in 
tactical environments, though tried and proven in the field, is 
designed around dated military technologies that support a 
communications doctrine consistent with the periods they were 
developed. However, as time and technology have advanced, the 
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information demands of battlefield environments have grown to the 
point of dwarfing the capacities of legacy systems that seem to only 
be able to advance their capacity through lengthy development time 
and increased financial investment. 
Information sharing has yet to be successfully and ubiquitously integrated 
at the tactical level for other forces operating in support of the current conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.  BFT, pictured in Figure 17, represents the current best-of-
breed of tactical information sharing.  The DoD Information Sharing 
Implementation Plan (2009b) says of the current state: “While leadership is 
beginning to convey the importance of an information sharing culture, the need 
still remains to institutionalize information sharing behaviors.”  In other words, 
currently, action and technology is lagging behind doctrine, policy and culture.   
 
Figure 17.   A Blue Force Tracker screen capture (From Kabis, 2008) 
This is not to say that there has been no progress in the information 
sharing realm.  The Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange 
System (CENTRIXS) network, used by many United States’ coalition partners, 
has expanded in use in Afghanistan and will soon out-number the amount of 
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Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) terminals in many locations.  
It is billed by the DoD (2009b) as a “first step in converging the physically 
separated mission partner networks.”  The most numerous attempts at 
comprehensive information sharing have been among partners during HA/DR 
operations.  Tools such as Civil-Military Link (CIMILink), Peace Operations 
Support Tool (POST), Non-combatant Evacuation Operation Tracking System 
2000 (NTS 2000), HarmonieWeb, and Relief Web are just a few that have been 
developed to meet this compelling need.  Unfortunately, as the DoD (2009b) 
describes, consolidating these activities to a single tool or making tools work 
together is a difficult task, resulting in the situation that exists currently: 
The uncoordinated development of DoD’s various civil support and 
SSTR unclassified information sharing initiatives resulted in 
capabilities that are useful within their respective AORs, but are 
stovepiped and not federated for use across DoD or combatant 
command geographic boundaries. Specifically, the lack of a 
federated SSTR architecture hinders combatant commands and 
mission partners from efficiently and effectively sharing information 
in civil support and SSTR operations. 
Information sharing tools, systems, and procedures have been effective in 
experiments and in limited application, so the next step for the DoD is to fund and 
implement these initiatives at the tactical level.  In a recent white paper, Major 
General Michael Flynn (Flynn, Pottinger, & Batchelor, 2010), the senior 
intelligence officer in Afghanistan, said that it was essential to be able to:  
… integrate information collected by civil affairs officers, Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT), atmospherics teams, Afghan liaison 
officers, female engagement teams, willing non-governmental 
organizations and development organizations, United Nations 
officials, psychological operations teams, human terrain teams, and 
infantry battalions, to name a few. 
The number of entities that would see gains in effectiveness through the 
use of information sharing tools far outnumbers what General Flynn mentions.  
Both tactical forces and the forces acting in a command and control function 
above them are looking for various capabilities that will help them.  These include 
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getting updates on enemy activity and threat levels, receiving a real time 
operational picture of force locations and missions, passing on their availability 
for tasking, viewing unmanned systems feeds, as well as sharing gathered 
biometric data.  These information sharing requirements expand beyond the 
United States’ own forces as future operations will likely continue to be coalition 
focused.  The Multinational Interoperability Council Concept Development and 
Experimentation Working Group (2008) states that for successful information 
sharing in future operating environments, “coalition forces will likely require the 
ability to: 
 Share, access, and store information across strategic and 
operational domains; 
 Obtain a comprehensive characterisation of all aspects of an 
operation (i.e., a network assessment) to include planning-related 
data, capabilities, restrictions, constraints, system connectivity, and 
interoperability information; 
 Tailor joint, interagency, and multinational information displays to 
provide a real-time and accurate depiction of the operational area 
of interest; 
 Fuse strategic level inputs such as intelligence and environmental 
information and operational level inputs from each of the 
environmental components (maritime, land, air, special forces, and 
logistics) into a tactical level common operating picture; 
 Support tactical agility, effects orchestration, self-synchronisation, 
and distributed decision-making using a common operating 
picture.” 
The primary advantage that is sought with the use of information sharing 
capabilities is decision superiority.  It is defined in Joint Vision 2020 (Shelton, 
2000) as “better decisions arrived at and implemented faster than an opponent 
can react, or in a noncombat situation, at a tempo that allows the force to shape 
the situation or react to changes and accomplish its mission.”  Joint Vision 2020 
also warns that decision superiority does not automatically come with information 
superiority, meaning that it takes more than an influx in information to make good 
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decisions.  The missing piece that effective information sharing provides is the 
“unity of effort” that the U.S. JCS (2007) says is made possible by “close, 
continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation.”  
The end result is that the tactical forces conducting operations, the operational 
level forces conducting command and control, and all other partners are more 
effective during operations.  This effectiveness is described by the U.S. JCS 
(2009b) as being able to “accurately visualize the situation, anticipate events, 
and make appropriate, timely decisions more effectively than adversary decision 
makers.” 
2. Potential Implementation 
As information sharing systems are integrated into riverine squadrons, 
many different roles of information collection, sharing, and utilization will take 
place within the different aspects of the squadron.  These roles will differ in scope 
depending on the tasks assigned to the different portions of the squadron based 
on the needs of current operations. 
The riverine squadron detachments would have the largest information 
sharing roles.  The boat detachments are simultaneously the portion of the unit in 
the position to be most ably to collect information for sharing, while at the same 
time, the most in need of information from others to enable effective operations.  
Any systems implementation would have to treat these roles with equal weight.  
Like the BFT, information sharing systems should be installed on all boats to 
ensure that in whatever configuration is used for any particular mission, the 
situational awareness that is afforded is not degraded.  Additionally, the 
interoperability between installed systems and the information sharing systems 
used by adjacent U.S. military units, as well as coalition partners must be a factor 
that is taken into account, but as the JCS (2009a) describes, “the most important 
requirements of this implication are frequent coordination and exercises with 
interagency and international partners and the development of common 
procedures before an occasion for commitment arises.”  As discussed in 
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Chapter IV regarding the Silver Fox, failure is imminent if systems are integrated 
without significant amount of time and resources devoted to training and 
exercising the operational use of those systems.  Lastly, boat detachments must 
be able to receive targeted information from the riverine headquarters element, 
which plays a critical role in making sure operating boat detachments get the 
most relevant and critical information in real time. 
The flexibility of riverine squadrons comes from their ability to seamlessly 
integrate various detachments of experts with special capabilities or systems.  
Past integration has included unmanned systems detachments, Naval Criminal 
Investigative Service (NCIS), combat engineers, Military Working Dogs (MWD), 
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), and many others.  Each of these groups 
has their own information sharing requirements that will need to be utilized and 
integrated while attached to riverine forces.  One effect this integration will have 
on all parties involved is the reduction of duplicate information.  Instead of each 
entity on any given mission reporting on an event, such as the finding of a 
weapons cache, the entity with the most expertise, an EOD unit in this case, 
would be able to create the appropriate report while subsequently sharing it with 
all known and unknown interested third parties. 
The last portion of the squadron with an information sharing role is the 
headquarters.  There, the role of an information manager must be created.  A 
watch position much like a Tactical Action Officer (TAO) on a U.S. Navy ship, the 
primary role would be to ensure detachments that are conducting operations are 
getting the information they need to be successful.  Since there is a plethora of 
information available, the headquarters plays a key role in sifting through it and 
pushing forward information that is immediately useful to the detachments, 
allowing them to focus on the mission at hand and at only the most useful level of 
prevalent information, preventing them from being overburdened and distracted.  
The advantage that the headquarters element of the squadron has in this role is 
that they have much more available bandwidth, can focus on the larger area of 
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influence, and have the ability to tap into multiple other resources that the 
operating detachments may not have access to. 
C. INFORMATION SHARING IN USE 
Information sharing, as it becomes more prevalent throughout the U.S. 
military, is going to be found to be useful throughout various types of conflict and 
through the associated full range of that conflict.  For stability operations 
specifically, the use of information sharing is discussed in the following three 
scenarios: 
 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
 Counterinsurgency 
 Government and Security Force Development 
1. Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
The U.S. JCS Joint Operating Concept for SSTRO contains a 
consolidated listing of the various objectives and associated capabilities that are 
required for the joint force commander to conduct these types of operations.  
Information sharing is specifically called out in this high-level joint document 
because it is apparent that it is critical to the success in the HA/DR mission via 











Provide unified action through 
joint command, control, and 
coordination 
The ability to conduct seamless knowledge 
sharing among DoD elements, U.S. 
Government agencies, and multinational 
partners prior to, during, and after the 
completion of SSTR operations. 
Deliver humanitarian assistance The ability to coordinate and integrate with 
USG agencies and multinational 
organizations in order to support 
humanitarian assistance and disaster 
response efforts. 
Table 10.   HA/DR information sharing objectives and capabilities from  
(U.S. JCS, 2006) 
One of the many challenges that are presented during HA/DR operations 
is that the diversity of all the different entities makes it difficult to have a 
concerted unity of effort.  The DoD (2009b) expects that the groups will be wide-
ranging, regularly being made up of “U.S. departments and agencies, foreign 
governments and security forces, international organizations, non-government 
organizations, and members of the private sector.”  Because the capabilities and 
needs of the various groups are very different, the likelihood that they are not 
aligned is unfortunately high.  As Barge, Davis, and Schwent (2003) argue, this is 
a hurdle that must be overcome because “neither the military nor the civilian can 
function effectively without the other. They are interdependent … making 
information sharing essential for mission accomplishment.”  Information sharing 
would help these different entities pool resources and work more effectively 
together to prevent duplication of effort and enhance the focus of effort.  This 
effort will only be able to be properly aligned when, as Benbow et al. (2006) lays 
out, “extensive planning, de-confliction, rehearsal, and coordination” are 
conducted.  The strength of information sharing is that it is specifically designed 
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to be independent of whether the entities are physically near each other or not.  
This makes the prospect of aligning these groups much more feasible to do when 
preparing for the next HA/DR operation, which for the most part, is of unknown 
and random time and location.  The DoD (2007) describes the result of this close 
coordination and preparedness as widely diverse units, that when called, are 
ready and able to “share information that promotes informed decision making, 
improves situational awareness, establishes economies of knowledge, and 
creates unity of effort.” 
An additional challenge that is presented during HA/DR operations is that 
the information needed to ensure success is both immense in scope and 
complicated in depth. The various entities supporting the operation will need 
information about population locations and vulnerabilities, conditions of 
infrastructure such as water, power, sewage, locations of aid sites and how much 
room for additional victims is available, locations where searches have and have 
not been conducted, as well as information about what actions other groups are 
taking.   This is only a few of the many data points needed by operational 
planners, but as Bridges and Mason (2003) make clear, quantity of information 
does not equate to quality in this type of environment, and that if “reasoned 
choices” are to be made, they must be made with an emphasis on quality.  The 
DoD Information Sharing Strategy (2007) defines this concept as “veracity”:  
The ability to create relevance and de-conflict potentially conflicting 
data received from a number of sources. While analysts and 
decision-makers may receive more information, more quickly, and 
from more directions, its accuracy, consistency, authority, currency 
and completeness must be validated. 
The way that the information needed to conduct operations can be made 
available to operating entities and validated is through information sharing.  The 
complexity of the amount and depth of information involved and the scrutiny that 
must be applied argues for dedicated systems of much greater capability than 
currently fielded systems. Ahciarliu (2004) agues that these systems should 
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follow the Structured Humanitarian Assistance Reporting (SHARE) approach 
which lays out guidelines for achieving veracity that include: 
 Geo-referenced information signifying where the data was 
collected, such as the latitude and longitude. 
 A time-stamp, particularly important in fast-moving emergencies 
where information validity is relative to time, indicating when data 
was collected and at what frequency. 
 Information about the data itself defining its credibility such as: the 
source of the information, the measurement standards and 
indicators used for the applied methodology. 
Information sharing systems built with the SHARE approach will increase 
the capability of those making operational decisions, resulting in aligned priorities 
of effort, people that are rescued and cared for quicker, supplies that are 
distributed in a more targeted manner, and aid money that is spent wisely.  
Riverine forces have a set of capabilities that are both unique and wide-
ranging.  The many types of activities that they could realistically be called upon 
to do during HA/DR operations include, but are not limited to, conducting search 
and rescue, transporting victims or refugees, completing surveys of infrastructure 
along the waterways, transporting supplies and materials, and providing 
movement for aid and recovery personnel. The U.S. JCS (2008) argues that in 
order for these types of capabilities to be taken advantage of by the various 
interagency, IGO, and NGO groups that are working beside one another, a 
collaborative environment must exist in which “participants share data, 
information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts, often in real time 
regardless of physical location.”  For the riverine forces, implementation of an 
information sharing capability allows for active participation in this role.  This will 
allow the myriad of capabilities of the riverine forces to become known and 
offered, allowing various entities to leverage them.  As Russo (2006) argues, this 
“seamless integration” of different groups, operating in support of common 
HA/DR objectives, “is essential to ensure that all of the combat and support 
elements can take advantage of one another’s strengths.”  
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In addition to having capabilities that can be leveraged, riverine forces are 
also an effective information gathering force.  Their access to areas that are 
either unreachable, or not commonly traveled by most other units makes them 
uniquely capable to get information that others may not be able to gather, such 
as whether areas along waterways have been searched, conditions of port 
facilities, and waterway conditions for other craft.  The advantage here lies not 
only with the fact that riverine forces are in a position that many other units 
cannot claim, but also that they are experts in the maritime domain.  One of the 
mission areas that riverine forces were designed for is Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA), which Benbow et al. (2006) defines as an “understanding of 
anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, 
safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”  This expertise, gained 
through the exercise of their MDA mission, allows the riverine forces to be the 
authoritative source on all information that is sought on maritime related issues.  
This maritime domain, which without riverine forces may be lacking due to lack of 
expertise, is an excellent opportunity for riverine forces in support of HA/DR 
operations to gather civil information, which the JCS (2009b) defines as 
“information developed from data about civil areas, structures, capabilities, 
organizations, people, and events that can be fused or processed to increase 
interagency, IGO, and NGO situational awareness.” 
2. Counterinsurgency 
Contained in the U.S. JCS Joint Operating Concept for SSTRO are 
objectives and capabilities necessary for successful operations throughout the 
range of conflict those stability operations present.  Included among these are 
specific objectives that put forth an argument that information sharing in the 
counterinsurgency portion of stability operations is a critical factor in attaining 




Provide unified action through 
joint command, control, and 
coordination 
The ability to conduct seamless knowledge 
sharing among DoD elements, U.S. 
Government agencies, and multinational 
partners prior to, during, and after the 
completion of SSTR operations. 
Establish responsive battlespace 
awareness / understanding 
The ability to tag, track, and localize hostile 
elements in all domains. 
Table 11.   Counterinsurgency information sharing objectives and capabilities  
From (U.S. JCS, 2006) 
One of the primary tactics that insurgents use is making themselves 
inconspicuous by blending in with the populace.  Insurgents’ ability to do this 
successfully is because counterinsurgents do not have enough experience or 
information about normal activities of the populace they are operating amongst.  
This is a fundamental deficiency that must be overcome, because in order to 
achieve success on COIN operations, the U.S. JCS (2009b) instructs that, 
“comprehensive knowledge of the operational environment,” is required.  The 
primary method for counterinsurgent forces to combat this setback is to 
consistently operate among the people.  These types of activities enable the 
opportunity to collect significant amounts of information to include data about the 
people, their activities, their desires and concerns.  Flynn et al. (2010) describe 
this plethora of information as “vast and underappreciated” and say success lies 
in the counterinsurgents’ ability to “acquire and provide knowledge about the 
population, the economy, the government, and other aspects of the dynamic 
environment we are trying to shape, secure, and successfully leave behind.”  
This information gathering and sharing prevents insurgents from being able to 
take sanctuary among the populace, especially when human information 
gathering is coupled with other technologies such as biometric, signals, and 
unmanned systems information gathering. New and upgraded information 
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systems are necessary to handle the inclusion of these technologies because as 
Marvin (2005) describes, the information that needs to be shared, fundamental to 
mission success, has “rapidly overtaken the capability of low bandwidth, purely 
voice network capability.”  
The second challenge that presents itself in a counterinsurgency 
environment is that the information that is most useful is found at the tactical level 
and shared up, which is the opposite that one would expect from conventional 
force-on-force conflict. The U.S. JCS (2009b) reasons that this is due to "the fact 
that all units collect and report information, combined with the mosaic nature of 
insurgencies.”  Sharing of this tactical level data is extremely valuable at the 
operational level, where assessments of progress are discerned and decisions 
about focus of effort are made, because as Bridges and Mason (2003) describe, 
“decision makers both at the field and at headquarters level need quality and 
sufficient information to serve as a basis for making reasoned choices.”  Getting 
the data from the lowest levels is very challenging, as at the tactical level, the unit 
is the most involved in day-to-day operations.  Thus, at this level, they bear the 
predominance of the burden of both operating on received information, gathering 
information, and preparing it for sharing.  Flynn et al. (2010) observed this 
information burden first hand in Afghanistan:  
At the battalion level and below, intelligence officers know a great 
deal about their local Afghan districts but are generally too 
understaffed to gather, store, disseminate, and digest the 
substantial body of crucial information that exists outside traditional 
intelligence channels.  
Seamless integration of information systems will reduce the workload of 
these overburdened units.  Sundland and Carroll (2008) describe the goal as 
being able to “collect, fuse, analyze, and disseminate information to decision 
makers to facilitate effective understanding.”  Achieving this goal can allow for 
more informed decisions to be made at the operational and strategic levels. 
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Because of their expertise in the maritime domain, riverine forces are 
more easily able to differentiate between the local populace and insurgents using 
the waterways.  For most units, it would be difficult to discern the difference 
between locals using the waterway for normal transit or commercial activity and 
the insurgents using it to transit around checkpoints or to transfer weapons and 
contraband to other sympathizers.  In order to become well versed in being able 
to tell the difference between the local populace and insurgents, an intense 
amount of time on station, talking to locals who live along, or work on the 
waterway is required.  Ryan (2007) says that this investment of both time and 
energy is warranted because “such interaction provides invaluable opportunities 
to gain insight into the local situation.”  Additionally, the intensity in which 
information is gathered from the local populace on the waterway will act as a 
deterrent to insurgents who would otherwise seek to utilize it as an alternative to 
the more densely manned roadways.  These encounters, when coupled with 
information sharing systems, allow for the collection, mining, and sharing of these 
nuances between units, allowing a much more enhanced capability to detect 
insurgents spread among other units that may not have in-person riverine 
support afforded to them.  As Cross (2007) describes, this is a core capability of 
U.S. Navy forces, as “ultimately, MDA is about collecting and sharing large 
amounts of data and information.” 
Riverine forces also provide an excellent tactical capability to gather 
information that can be useful at the operational and strategic levels.  One of the 
biggest reasons that riverine forces can do this is because they have the ability to 
travel much longer distances than most ground units will during normal 
operations by traveling along the waterways.  This method of travel allows 
riverine forces to travel between operating areas expeditiously, and at times, 
allows them the capability to provide support to multiple operating areas at the 
same time.  This ability to maneuver with more freedom between operating areas 
affords them multiple advantages in the information domain.  One advantage that 
is gained is that by having the same force supporting multiple operating areas is 
 76
that the information gathered, packaged, and sent to higher commands comes 
from one singular source.  This ability satisfies what Rumsfeld (2006) described 
in the 2006 QDR when he said that what was needed was “increased situational 
awareness and shared information on potential threats.”  Obtaining information 
from a singular source allows for less variability to exist in the information that is 
received, making the tasks that must be undertaken using this information much 
less subject to risks and uncertainty that come with variability in information 
reporting.  Additionally, the riverine force’s ability to support numerous ground 
units in different areas of operation provides this unique capability to be spread 
throughout the battle space in a targeted fashion by operational leadership.  As 
Hochstedler (2006) describes, this targeted capability increases the frequency in 
which information can be collected and allows operational commanders to 
“greatly increase the power to counter asymmetric threats in the maritime 
environment.” 
3. Government and Security Force Development 
To effectively accomplish government and security force development, 
various broad objectives need to be accomplished.  Information sharing can play 
a large part in making these easier to accomplish, and hence speed up the 
development effort.  Of the many objectives described in the U.S. JCS SSTRO 
JOC, the following objectives listed in Table 12 are ones that meet the goals of 
government and security force development and will likely benefit greatly from 








Provide unified action through 
joint command, control, and 
coordination 
The ability to conduct seamless knowledge 
sharing among DOD elements, U.S. 
Government agencies, and multinational 
partners prior to, during, and after the 
completion of SSTR operations. 
Establish a representative, 
effective government and the rule 
of law 
The ability to assist in the organization and 
training of personnel to work in the various 
government ministries and agencies. 
Table 12.   Government and security force development information sharing 
objectives and capabilities from (U.S. JCS, 2006) 
Government development activities are very challenging because they 
involve a myriad of forces trying to advise the smallest and most basic units 
throughout the country.  It many cases, the activities being developed are the 
same in the adjacent town, province, or operating area, but little information is 
available about the lessons learned regarding what has been working, what has 
not, and what resources are most needed to make the development mission a 
success in the shortest time possible.  In addition to the goals and objectives of 
the training being the same, but disconnected, the training is further complicated 
by the various different entities conducting the training, which can range from 
special operations forces, regular forces of various services, international 
partners, to civilian contractors.  This diverse group of trainers and mentors that 
are tasked with this development role face an uphill battle on maintaining 
commonality and consistency in the mentoring they provide.  Information sharing 
systems would help this situation.  The U.S. JCS (2007) calls this necessary 
coordination the “vital link” and touts many advantages to include the ability to 
“build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct 
coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared goals.”  Through the use of 
information sharing systems, efficiencies would be gained by using the best 
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practices discovered during operations, even though the operating areas may be 
disconnected by time or space.  In the DoD (2009b) Information Sharing 
Implementation Plan, it says stability operations “necessitate interaction and 
information sharing with many external organizations.”  These systems would 
accomplish this by allowing for collaboration and detailed planning to take place 
between forces of different make-ups.  
During security force development operations, brilliance in the basics is 
the primary focus of training.  To move beyond this and achieve a level of 
expertise to a point whereby units can operate in support of one another requires 
skills and experience most times not found in newly established security forces.  
These forces will need to successfully operate among each other and in doing 
so, as Benbow et al. (2006) lay out, will “need to conduct extensive planning, de-
confliction, rehearsal, coordination to avoid blue-on-blue casualties.”  
Additionally, as a recruiting incentive during security force development 
operations, many new recruits are offered assignments to units near their home.  
While this is working well as a recruiting incentive, it provides an additional 
challenge to forces involved in security force development, as it is difficult to 
develop trust relationships between units that have little in common, or with 
forces that do not have a diversity of locations or life experiences to rely upon.  
These challenges present a problem that can be eased with the integration of 
information sharing systems into the developing forces.  The DoD (2007) 
describes a culture of sharing as “a mindset where information is continually 
shared as a normal course of work.”  The implementation and integration of this 
culture early on in the training pipelines for these new security forces will foster a 
much more comprehensive approach to information sharing among disparate 
units and allow for cohesion to develop through integrated operations that would 
be difficult to otherwise create.  It is also very likely that with being able to 
leverage the knowledge and assistance of other units, the speed in which units 
will reach a level of maturity and are capable of autonomous operations is likely 
to be significantly faster. 
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The ability to operate on waterways gives riverine forces the advantage of 
not being confined to a single operating area in many instances.  This is a 
definitive advantage when it can be utilized, but in some cases this is not 
possible due to the nature of the waterway terrain.  This waterway terrain 
limitation is not unique to riverine forces, as any government entity that riverine 
forces are conducting development with will have to adapt to the same 
limitations.  There are various things that can prevent units from being able to 
take advantage of the entire waterway.  For example, in Iraq, a dam, shallow 
water, and landlocked waterways that existed caused riverine forces to either not 
be able to operate on a continuous body of water, or even required separate 
deployment locations for riverine detachments.  These types of limitations are 
annotated by the OSD (2005) as hindrances to the “speed, agility, and flexibility” 
needed to conduct operations.  This instance, where the reach of riverine forces 
or government entities is limited, argues for the advantages gained by the use of 
information sharing systems to be leveraged to include what Cohen et al. (2006) 
explain as the increased ability to “make observations, draw lessons, apply them, 
and assess results.”  Information sharing will allow government entities that suffer 
from instances of physical disconnectedness to share lessons learned in 
developing their capabilities, making the maturity of the government development 
effort reach fruition with much more expediency and simultaneously preventing 
what Barge et al. (2003) describe as the “shortfalls, friction and redundancy of 
effort“ that can develop otherwise.  
Riverine forces are many times not used as the locus of effort, but serve 
as a support entity to operations taking place on land.  This is a crucial mission 
area for riverine forces to teach to security forces.  Coordination is challenging 
and requires seamless integration during both the planning and execution 
phases of operations.  What can make this coordination even more challenging is 
attempting to do so during operations utilizing only tactical radio circuits.  This 
type of coordination can be executed, but overcoming communication obstacles 
requires intense amounts of established common operating procedures, training, 
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and practice before being able to be successfully employed in an operational 
environment.  The integration of information sharing systems can allow for a 
more comprehensive ability to work together in these challenging environments.  
The DoD (2007) argues that information sharing allows units to “achieve dynamic 
situational awareness and enhance decision making.”  This type of advantage 
allows forces the ability to be adaptive and nimble in assisting each other when 
fast-moving situations present themselves, allowing for the most effective use of 
the capabilities on hand to be used at the correct time and place.  Russo (2006) 
states that what is needed is “a common operating environment that seamlessly 
integrates all of the units involved.”  This type of operating environment leads to 
close coordination, and when coupled with effective use of combat power, can 
promote legitimacy of the security forces among the population, as they become 
more effective at securing their country. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Information sharing is the critical factor that allows operational 
commanders to make the best decisions possible.  The commander making 
these decisions, with the gains able to be made from information sharing, has 
more data, data of different types, and data from different sources, all of which 
are able to be used in concert with staff and field expertise to advise on the best 
course of action for any endeavor that stability operations may present.  Riverine 
forces are only at the beginning stages of implementing information sharing 
systems, but as systems like the BFT are brought online and utilized during 
operations, the benefits are readily apparent and are easily assimilated into 
normal day-to-day operations.  The ultimate goal is for leaders to be able to 
make better decisions, faster, especially in the realms of stability operations, and 
implementation of information sharing capabilities allows them to do exactly that. 
In the following chapter, the discussions of biometric, unmanned, and 
information sharing systems will come together to describe a riverine force that is 
a much more dominant and effective force due to implementation of these new 
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technologies.  The conclusion will also discuss how the riverine force is just one 
of many units conducting stability operations that could benefit from the same 
technological revolution that is proposed for the riverine force in this thesis.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A. A NEWLY EQUIPPED NAVAL RIVERINE FORCE 
Breaking from the mold of the 20th century paradigms that have defined 
today’s U.S. Military make–up, a newly equipped riverine force would be 
equipped with the latest technology that would not expand its mission beyond 
what doctrine, publications, and instructions delineate, but would rather make 
those roles and responsibilities able to be accomplished in a much more effective 
manner.  Stability operations are the fundamental mission the military must be 
prepared for in the 21st century, and the U.S. Navy Riverine Force is a unit that 
is capable and ready to perform its mission in this challenging arena. 
Riverine forces are able to fill a critical gap between where traditional land 
and maritime forces can effectively operate.  Because these areas are so 
important and are home to significant segments of the population, they can also 
serve as a key operational area during stability operations.  While this is where 
the riverine force strength lies, its disadvantages must be compensated for.  The 
current disadvantages that greatly increase operational risk include a reduced 
capability to engage the population, reduced situational awareness, and limited 
communication reach-back capability.  These limitations fundamentally make the 
riverine force mission a more dangerous one, adding risk that is unnecessary 
and correctable. 
Compensating for and correcting these risks involves improving the 
technological capability of the riverine force in three tiers: biometric, unmanned, 
and information sharing systems.  These improvements will have a significant 
effect throughout the range of operations that riverine forces will be tasked to 
operate in.  As was argued in Chapter I, the most likely situation that riverine 
forces will be called upon to address in the future is going to be stability  
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operations, in which humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
counterinsurgency, and government and security force development will 
constitute the crux of what is tasked. 
Navy Riverine forces play a unique role in HA/DR scenarios because they 
are able to access different areas of terrain that are otherwise not accessible due 
to various reasons.  This access provides the operational commander the ability 
to utilize riverine forces to assess the condition of the affected area using 
unmanned systems, access key population centers to begin biometric profiling, 
and to begin to share data and inferences using information sharing systems.  
This allows the lead forces to prepare the terrain for additional organizations 
such as NGO’s and IGO’s, mitigating possible duplication of effort, and 
immediately leveraging the capabilities of the various support organizations when 
they arrive.  Ultimately, this integration leads to a more expeditious search and 
rescue effort, seamlessly leading to follow-on rebuilding endeavors. 
One of the most basic tasks riverine forces have during counterinsurgency 
operations is to execute patrols and immerse themselves amongst what is almost 
always the center of gravity, the people.  This access to the terrain, both physical 
and human, allows riverine forces to conduct TSE to include biometric profiling, 
use of unmanned systems to enhance situational awareness, and participate in 
both the collection and sharing of critical information with both adjacent units and 
operational commanders.  This information that is gathered and shared helps 
prevent insurgents from being able to take sanctuary among the populace.  As 
one would expect, better decisions are consistently made when those who need 
it receive more accurate and timely information, and riverine forces can play a 
critical role in both the collection and use of this important data. 
The instructing of foreign waterborne forces has been a staple mission of 
the riverine force for decades.  The challenge of government and security force 
development requires steady advances in capacity and capability in order to gain 
the confidence of the population.  Riverine forces are able to accomplish both of 
these through the training of the local government or security force that would 
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conduct enforcement of policy or law on the waterways.  With riverine force 
assistance, the developing units will learn the utilization of biometrics to enhance 
their ability to understand the population, unmanned systems to focus effort on 
the people rather than on mundane tasks able to be accomplished otherwise, 
and information sharing in order to reap the benefits of lessons learned and pool 
resources.  This development, with a culture of sharing information embedded 
early on, can allow these government entities and security forces to establish 
early effectiveness and gain trust and confidence from the people of their 
country. 
B. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JOINT FORCE 
This thesis has put forth the argument that U.S. Navy Riverine forces can 
be aptly equipped with advanced technology, resulting in a drastic increase in 
capability for a relatively low cost.  This situation is not unique to the riverine 
forces.  Many of the arguments presented here are based on the unique 
characteristics of the riverine force or their capability to operate in an 
environment few others can, but these recommendations for the equipping of 
these technologies find merit in many other units throughout the joint force.  
While it may seem intuitive, the DoD would not create units that are no different 
than others in terms of their operational mission, or provide no advanced 
capability than their predecessor.  Therefore, it must be understood that each 
unit is unique, operating on a unique landscape, with unique capabilities.  When 
these are brought to bear, and combined with the rest of the joint force, it creates 
an overlapping and all-encompassing fabric of military capability.  What the 
technologies in this thesis provide for the joint force is not a new piece to this 
fabric, but a higher “stitch count,” if you will, making the joint force more effective, 
efficient, and resilient in the capabilities they exercise than previously capable.  It 
should be understood that for the most part, almost every unit that has operated 
outside of the wire in Operation Iraqi Freedom or Operation Enduring Freedom is 
likely a prime candidate to be supplemented with biometric, unmanned, and 
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information sharing systems, if they have not been already.  Doing so 
accomplishes the advances in capability already discussed, but in a manner that 
takes into account the realities of the fiscal environment that usually follows long 
periods of extended conflict.  Large, high cost, or long duration weapon system 
acquisitions are going to be difficult to argue for, so the focus of the joint force in 
the post-war years should be on resetting the force, updating the equipment, and 
training for future conflict. 
As was mentioned in Chapter I, the future conflict the United States can 
expect to be involved in is likely to mirror the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The reason behind this is because, from the perspective of opposition forces, 
pulling the United States into a protracted and unconventional conflict is simply 
the most effective way to simultaneously wear down the military power and public 
support needed for the United States to participate in that type of conflict.  While 
not all stability operations are caused by actions of opposition forces, i.e., natural 
disasters, the ones that are will be inspired by lessons from the conflicts in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.  While the U.S. may ultimately prevail in those conflicts from the 
U.S. perspective, it will simultaneously be a modern lesson for unconventional 
forces on how to wage 21st century war against the United States.  It only makes 
sense to prepare for this type of conflict by strengthening the ability to work more 
cohesively among our own forces and with the forces of the allies of the United 
States.  Implementing biometric, unmanned, and information sharing systems 
with those goals in mind and with an understanding of what 21st century conflict 
will bring may not be as staunch a deterrent as 20th century weapons systems, 
but will serve as systems that can and will be used to make the inevitable 
warfighting and disaster response a much less costly endeavor in terms of time, 




This thesis purposely did not explore in depth the technical requirements 
for the implementation of the various information technology systems that were 
argued for.  Further research would be very advantageous to type and system 
commands that are exploring options for the integration of various IT systems, 
especially within the riverine force.  Specifically, how new systems will be able to 
utilize or leverage existing communication architecture is of critical importance.  
Also of importance is upgrading the communications architecture to 802.16 to be 
able to handle the increasing amount of data that will need to be sent during 
operations.  Additional research could be done into how the integration of the IT 
systems mentioned in this thesis could be incorporated into NECC as whole to 
make the concept of adaptive force packaging more of a reality.  Also of interest 
is how NECC forces will deploy and operate when large-scale conflicts do not 
exist and stability operations continue to be the predominant type of operation 
that is conducted.  The most likely way to do this is by leveraging U.S. Navy 
amphibious ships and NECC sea bases.  This would require IT upgrades to 
those platforms as well, which would be another instance in which further 
research is necessary.  Lastly, NTTP 3-06.1 Riverine Operations mentions that if 
multiple riverine squadrons were deployed at one time, the Riverine Group would 
be required to take operational control of the forces in theater.  Unfortunately, 
Riverine Group One is not properly equipped for this eventuality, nor is NECC 
headquarters equipped to operationally control any NECC adaptive force 
packages.  Further research that would be very valuable would be a study into 
what IT resources would be needed to be able to accomplish the appropriate 
command and control functions from these headquarters.  Processes, 
procedures, command and organizational structures will likely need to be 
examined as well. 
 88
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 89
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ackerman, R. K. (2007). Riverine challenges mirror joint operations. Signal.  
Retrieved October 10, 2010 from Fairfax, VA: AFCEA Signal Online: 
http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/Signal_Article_Template.as
p?articleid=1351&zoneid=210 
Ahciarliu, C. M. (2004). Multi-agent architecture for integrating remote databases 
and expert sources with situational awareness tools: humanitarian 
operations scenario. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Aho, B. (2006). Iraqi soldier assigned to Iraqi riverine police force. Retrieved 
September 16, 2010 from Washington, DC: United States Department of 
the Navy: http://www.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=40455 
Barge, H., Davis, M. S., & Schwent, J. T. (2003). Field level information 
collaboration during complex humanitarian emergencies and peace 
operations. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Beaver, J. W., Mercado, P. R., Bucher, A .D., Free, J. M., Byers, R. W., & 
Oliveria, T. V. (2006). Systems analysis of alternative architectures for 
riverine warfare in 2010. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Benbow, R., Ensminger, F., Swartz, P., Savitz, S., & Stimpson, D. (2006). 
Renewal of Navy's riverine capability: A preliminary examination of past, 
current and future capabilities. Retrieved November 13, 2009 from Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA447820 
Biometrics Identity Management Agency. (2009). Biometric use cases. Retrieved 
March 8, 2010 from Washington, DC: Biometrics Identity Management 
Agency: 
http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/References/biometricusecases.aspx 
Biometrics Task Force. (2008). Biometrics task force annual report FY2008. 






Bridges, D. M. &, Mason, A. R.  (2003). Exploring of wireless technology to 
provide information sharing among military, United Nations and civilian 
organizations during complex humanitarian emergencies and 
peacekeeping operations. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Boraz, S. C. (2009). Maritime domain awareness: Myths and realities. United 
States Naval War College Review, Summer 2009. Retrieved March 4, 
2010 from Newport, RI: United States Naval War College: 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/26abc82e-a497-4933-9bbc-
67881e714c3d/Maritime-Domain-Awareness--Myths-and-Realities---S 
Boyd, J. M. (2008). New handheld device meets maritime challenge. The 
Biometric Scan, Volume 4, Issue 1. Retrieved March 8, 2010 from 
Washington, DC: Biometrics Identity Management Agency: 
http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Newsletter/issues/2008/Jan/v4issue1_pm.ht
ml 
Boyd, J. M. (2009). Navy contributions to identity management. Presentation 
delivered at the Biometric Consortium Conference, Tampa, FL.  Retrieved 
March 11, 2010 from Fort Meade, MD: The Biometric Consortium: 
http://biometrics.org/bc2009/presentations/tuesday/Boyd_NAVY%20BR%
20A%20Tue%201117-1126.pdf 
Bush, G. W. (2006). National Security Strategy of the United States of America  
Retrieved October 3, 2009 from Washington, DC: White House Archives: 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf 
Cartwright, J. E. (2009). 2009 Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) 
Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs). Retrieved December 5, 2009 from 
Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/education/sae_2009.pdf 
Cassidy, R. M. (2004). Back to the street without joy: Counterinsurgency lessons 
from Vietnam and other small wars. Parameters, 34. Retrieved March 3, 
2010 from Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/04summer/cassidy
.pdf 
Center for Army Lessons Learned. (2008a). Military police and 
counterinsurgency operations: Operation Iraqi freedom initial impressions 
report (IIR).  Retrieved February 4, 2010 from George Town, Grand 




Center for Army Lessons Learned. (2008b). Tactical site exploitation. Retrieved 
September 6, 2010 from Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army 
Combined Arms Center: 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/thesaurus/toc.asp?id=29093 
Climate Change Science Program (CCSP). (2008). Analyses of the effects of 
global change on human health and welfare and human systems. A 
Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and the 
Subcommittee on Global Change Research. [Ebi, K.L., Sussman, F.G., 
Wilbanks T.J., Gamble, J.L. (Eds.)]. Retrieved December 11, 2009 from 
Washington, DC: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=197244 
Cohen, E., Crane, C., Horvath, J., & Nagl, J. (2006).  Principles, imperatives, and 
paradoxes of counterinsurgency. Military Review, March-April 2006. 
Retrieved December 5, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA486811 
Cordesman, A. H. (2004). The “post-conflict” lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Retrieved November, 15, 2009 from Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 
and International Studies: 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts040519cordesman.pdf 
Cordesman, A. H. (2005). The Iraq war and its strategic lessons for 
counterinsurgency. Retrieved November 15, 2009 from Washington, DC: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies: 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/050912_countinusrg.pdf 
Cross, E. C. (2007). Modern advances to the Modular Fly-Away Kit (MFLAK) to 
support maritime interdiction operations. Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Deady, T. K. (2005). Lessons from a successful counterinsurgency: The 
Philippines, 1899-1902. Parameters, 35. Retrieved October 27, 2009 from 
Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College: 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/05spring/deady.pd
f  
Defense Information Systems Agency. (2010). Introduction to the defense 
information systems agency campaign plan. Retrieved March 13, 2010 





Department of Defense. (2008). Department of defense biometrics enterprise 
strategic plan 2008-2015.  Retrieved March 12, 2010 from Washington, 
DC: Department of the Army Biometrics Task Force: 
https://secure.biometrics.dod.mil/Home/Files/20080827_DoD_Biometrics_
Enterprise_Strategic_Plan.pdf 
Department of Defense Directive Number 3000.07. (2008). Irregular Warfare. 
Retrieved January 22, 2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300007p.pdf 
Department of Defense Directive Number 8220.02. (2009). Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) Capabilities for Support of Stabilization 
and Reconstruction, Disaster Relief, and Humanitarian and Civic 
Assistance Operations. Retrieved January 22, 2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: 
Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/822002p.pdf  
Department of Defense Instruction Number 3000.05. (2009). Stability Operations. 
Retrieved November 13, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300005p.pdf 
Director, Navy Staff. (2005). Implementation of Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) 
Guidance Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) capabilities. Retrieved 
January 29, 2010 from Monterey, CA: Homeland Security Digital Library: 
https://knxas1.hsdl.org/?view&doc=48077&coll=0 
Duhan, D. P. (2005). Tactical decision aid for unmanned vehicles in maritime 
missions. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Faram, M. D. (2008). CO: Riverines must stay close to Marines. Navy Times. 
Retrieved October 8, 2010 from Springfield, VA: Navy Times: 
http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/04/navy_riverines_042708w/ 
Ferebee, J. M. (2009). Maximizing situational awareness: improving situational 
awareness with global positioning system data in the maritime 
environment. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Flores, R. A. (2007). Improving the U.S. Navy riverine capability: lessons from 





Flynn, M. T., Pottinger, M. F., & Batchelor, P. D. (2010). Fixing intel: A blueprint 
for making intelligence relevant in Afghanistan. Retrieved March 8, 2010 
from Washington D.C.: Center for a New American Security: 
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2
010_code507_voices.pdf  
Freitas, M., & Treadway, B. W. (1994). Stygian myth: U.S. riverine operations 
against the guerilla. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Galli, M., Turner, J. M., & Olson, K. A., Mortensen, M. G., Wharton, N. D., 
Williams, E. C.  . . . Shan, O. W. (2007). Riverine sustainment 2012. 
Retrieved October 27, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469560 
Galula, D. (1964). Counterinsurgency warfare: Theory and practice. New York, 
NY: Praeger. 
Gates, R. M. (2010). Quadrennial defense review report. Retrieved March 4, 
2010 from Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense: 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/images/QDR_as_of_12Feb10_1000.pdf 
Hedderly, J. W. (2008). A seakeeping study on the autonomous sustainment 
cargo container delivery system. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
Hochstedler, R. A. (2006). Implementation of a modular Fly Away Kits (FLAK) for 
C4ISR in order to counter asymmetric threats in the coalition riverine and 
maritime theatres. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA. 
Hodge, N. (2009). U.S. Struggles with ‘Electronic Fratricide’ in Afghanistan. 
Wired. Retrieved October 8, 2010 from New York, NY: Wired: 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/11/us-struggles-with-electronic-
fratricide-in-afghanistan/ 
Hom, A. R. (2008). The new legs race: Critical perspectives on biometrics in Iraq.  
Military Review, January-February 2008. Retrieved March 12, 2010 from 
Fort Leavenworth, KS: United States Army Combined Arms Center: 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryRevi
ew_20080228_art013.pdf 
Hunt, A. F. (2010). Lance Corporal Maxx A. Juusola.  Retrieved August 10, 2010 








Jennings, K., & Chan, Y. (2005). Applications of biometrics in mass disaster 
victim identification. Retrieved March 3, 2010 from East Lansing, MI: 




Jennings, T. (2009). Department of defense biometrics program overview. 
Presentation delivered at the Armed Forces Communication and 
Electronics Association Monthly Luncheon, Fort Belvoir, VA.  Retrieved 
March 13, 2010 from Bethesda, MD: Armed Forces Communication and 
Electronics Association, Belvoir Chapter: 
http://www.afceabelvoir.org/userdocuments/SpeakerPresentations/AFCEA
BelvoirDoDBiometricsPMBriefing10282009.pdf 
Johnson, S. E. (2005). Deployable Network Operations Center (DNOC): A 
collaborative technology infrastructure designed to support tactical sensor-
decision maker network operations. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
Junker, D. B. (2008). Office of Naval Research (ONR) Maritime Domain 
Awareness (MDA) vision. Presentation delivered at the Maritime Security 
and Domain Awareness Conference, San Diego, CA. 
Kabis, B. (2008). Blue force tracker screen capture. Retrieved November 11, 
2010 from Laughlin Air Force Base, TX: Laughlin Air Force Base News: 
http://www.laughlin.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123082048 
Kelley, S. W. (2005). An analysis of the use of medical applications required for 
complex humanitarian disasters and emergencies via Hastily Formed 
Networks (HFN) in the field. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
LaFranci, H. (2001). Rivers: the last frontier in coca war. The Christian Science 
Monitor. Retrieved October 12, 2009 from Boston, MA: The Christian 
Science Monitor: 
http://search.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/06/12/p6s1.htm 
Lim, M. H., & Ng, M. Y. C. (2007). An integrated architecture to support the 
Hastily Formed Network (HFN). Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
 95
Marvin, C. E. (2005). 802.16 OFDM rapidly deployed network for near-real-time 
collaboration of expert services in maritime security operations. Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
McCoy, K. M. (2009). Naval sea systems command overview. Presentation 
delivered at the 14th Annual Expeditionary Warfare Conference, Panama 
City, FL.  Retrieved March 13, 2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense 
Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009expedition/mccoy.pdf 
McCurry, M. C. (2006). Riverine force—A vital Navy capability for the Joint Force 
Commander. Retrieved October 27, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense 
Technical Information Center: http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA463522 
McNamee, W. (2010). Earthquake evacuees await rescue.  Retrieved July 10, 




McQuilkin, W. C. (1997). Operation Sealords: A front in a frontless war, an 
analysis of the brown-water Navy in Vietnam. Master’s thesis, Army 
Command and General Staff College. Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
Mercado, A. (2008). Exploring data sharing between geographically distributed 
mobile and fixed nodes supporting Extended Maritime Interdiction 
Operations (EMIO). Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA. 
Mullen, M. G. (2009). CJCS guidance for 2009-2010. Retrieved February 1, 2010 
from Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff: 
http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/2009-
12/122109083003_CJCS_Guidance_for_2009-2010.pdf 
Multinational Interoperability Council Concept Development and Experimentation 
Working Group. (2008). Future coalition operating environment: 
Interoperability challenges for the future—Version 3.0.  Retrieved 
December 17, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information 
Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/futurecoalitionevnv3.doc 
Naval Air Systems Command. (2010). DON awards STUAS contract. Retrieved 




Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (2010). Riverine force fact sheet. 
Retrieved December 13, 2010 from Virginia Beach, VA: Naval 
Expeditionary Combat Command: 
http://www.public.navy.mil/usff/necc/Documents/RIVERINE_FactSheet%2
0-%202010%20v2.pdf 
O'Rourke, R. (2006). Navy role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) —
Background and issues for Congress. Retrieved January 30, 2010 from 
Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA479030 
O'Rourke, R. (2009). Navy role in irregular warfare and counterterrorism: 
Background and issues for Congress. Retrieved January 30, 2010 from 
Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA501330 
Office of Naval Research. (2009). Silver Fox UAV. Retrieved October 8, 2010 
from San Francisco, CA: Wikimedia: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Silver_Fox_UAV.jpg 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2005). Unmanned aircraft systems roadmap 
2005-2030. Retrieved March 17, 2010 from Washington, DC: Federation 
of American Scientists: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_roadmap2005.pdf 
Office of the Secretary of Defense. (2009). Unmanned systems integrated 
roadmap 2009-2034. Retrieved March 17, 2010 from Washington, DC: 
Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and 
Logistics: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/psa/docs/UMSIntegratedRoadmap2009.pdf 
Olive-Drab.com. (2010). Harris AN-PRC 117F. Retrieved November, 9, 2010 
from Calabasas, CA: Olive-Drab.com: http://www.olive-
drab.com/od_electronics_anprc117.php 
Oliver, G. (2008). Security, stability, transition, and reconstruction operations 
[Video]. Newport, RI: United States Naval War College. 
Paquin, K. R. (2009). Use of conventional U.S. Naval Forces to conduct FID in 
Colombia. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Phang, N. S. (2006). Tethered operation of autonomous aerial vehicles to 
provide extended field of view for autonomous ground vehicles. Master’s 
thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
 
 97
Quarles, E. L. (2008). An analysis of collaborative technological advancements 
achieved through the Center for Network Innovation and Experimentation. 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Rumsfeld, D. H. (2006). Quadrennial defense review report.  Retrieved August 
23, 2009 from Washington, DC: United States Department of Defense: 
http://www.defense.gov/qdr/report/report20060203.pdf 
Russo, J. A. (2006). Test and evaluation of meshdynamics 802.11 multi-radio 
mesh modules in support of coalition riverine operations. Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Ryan, M. (2007). The military and reconstruction operations. Parameters, 37. 
Retrieved March 3, 2010 from Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War 
College: 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/Articles/07winter/ryan.pdf 
Sasser Jr., & W. E. (2007). AFRICOM: The U.S. Navy's emergent missions and 
capability gaps. Retrieved November 30, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: 
Defense Technical Information Center: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA470726 
Shedd, D. R. (2009). Quadrennial intelligence community review. Retrieved 
February 24, 2010 from Washington, DC: Federation of American 
Scientists: http://www.fas.org/irp/dni/qicr.pdf 
Shelton, H. H. (2000). Joint vision 2020. Retrieved August 20, 2009 from 
Washington, DC: United States Forest Service: 
http://www.fs.fed.us/fire/doctrine/genesis_and_evolution/source_materials/
joint_vision_2020.pdf 
Snow, K., Harris, D., & Adhikari, B. (2010). Haiti Relief: Anger Mounts Among 
Desperate Haitians Over Supplies Stuck at Airport. ABC News. Retrieved 
October 14, 2010 from New York, NY: ABC News: 
http://abcnews.go.com/WN/HaitiEarthquake/haiti-earthquake-tensions-
mount-supplies-stuck-airport/story?id=9573873&page=1 
Spangler, D. J. (1995). What lessons can be drawn from U.S. riverine operations 
during the Vietnam War as the U.S. Navy moves into the twenty-first 
century. Master’s thesis, Army Command and General Staff College, Fort 
Leavenworth, KS. 
Speer, G. D. (2002). US Colombia Policy: What’s Next? (Statement before the 
Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and 




Stavroulakis, G. (2006). Rapidly deployable, self forming, wireless networks for 
maritime interdiction operations. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
Stolzenburg, M. A. (2008). Unified vision for the future: Riverine squadrons and 
the security cooperation MAGTF. Master’s Thesis, Army Command and 
General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 
Stone, A. (2009). Military patrol boat.jpg. Retrieved January 10, 2010 from San 
Francisco, CA: Wikimedia: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Military_patrol_boat.jpg 
Stubbs, B. B., Clapp, E. (2009). Navy moving forward with tactical (biometric) 
identity management system. Defense Daily. Retrieved March 20, 2010 
from Washington, DC: DoD Executive Agent for Maritime Domain 
Awareness: http://www.dodeaformda.navy.mil/contentview.aspx?id=634 
Sundland, J. J., & Carroll, C. J. (2008). Transforming data and metadata into 
actionable intelligence and information within the maritime domain. 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Telegraph. (2010). Haiti earthquake: 400,000 to be resettled outside Port-au-
Prince. Telegraph. Retrieved June 30, 2010 from London, United 




Tomes, R. R. (2004). Relearning counterinsurgency warfare. Parameters, 34.  




Towell, P. (2009). Defense: FY2010 authorization and appropriations. 
Congressional Research Service. Retrieved January 29, 2010 from Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA511913 
United Nations Children’s Fund. (2009). Tsunami report: Five year anniversary.  






United States Army and United States Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center. 
(2009). Situation report. Retrieved February 17, 2010 from Fort 




United States Department of Defense. (2007). Information sharing strategy. 
Retrieved October 30, 2009 from Washington, D.C.: Department of 
Defense: http://cio-nii.defense.gov/docs/InfoSharingStrategy.pdf 
United States Department of Defense. (2008). National defense strategy of the 
United States of America. Retrieved October 12, 2009 from Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/2008%20national%20defense%20strategy.p
df 
United States Department of Defense. (2009a). Quadrennial roles and missions 
review report. Retrieved October 8, 2010 from Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jan2009/QRMFinalReport_v26Jan.pdf 
United States Department of Defense. (2009b). Information sharing 
implementation plan. Retrieved October 30, 2010 from Washington, D.C.: 
Department of Defense: http://cio-nii.defense.gov/docs/DoD%20ISIP%20-
%20APR%202009_approved.pdf 
United States Department of the Navy. (2006). Navy transformation. Hearing 
before the Readiness Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed 
Services, House of Representatives. Retrieved February 19, 2010 from 
Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109hhrg10933793/pdf/CHRG-
109hhrg10933793.pdf 
United States Department of the Navy. (2008). NTTP 3-06.1 Riverine Operations.  
Newport, RI: Naval Warfare Development Command. 
United States Government Accountability Office. (2004). Information security: 
Technologies to secure federal systems. Retrieved January 22, 2010 from 
Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office: 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04467.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2001). Joint publication 1-02: Department of 
defense dictionary of military and associated terms. Retrieved November 
1, 2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf 
 100
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2004). National military strategy of the United 
States of America. Retrieved October 12, 2009 from Washington, DC: 
Department of Defense: 
http://www.defense.gov/news/mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2006). Military Support to Stabilization, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating 
Concept (JOC). (Version 2.0). Retrieved November 1, 2009 from Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/sstro_joc_v20.doc 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2007). Joint publication 1: Doctrine for the 
armed forces of the United States. Retrieved November 1, 2009 from Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2008). Joint publication 3-0: Joint operations. 
Retrieved November 1, 2009 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical 
Information Center: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2009a). Capstone concept for joint 
operations  (Version 3.0). Retrieved November 1, 2009 from Norfolk, VA: 
Joint Forces Command: 
http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2009/CCJO_2009.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2009b). Joint publication 3-24: 
Counterinsurgency operations. Retrieved November 1, 2009 from Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_24.pdf 
United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2010). Joint publication 3-10: Joint security 
operations in theater. Retrieved March 13, 2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: 
Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_10.pdf 
Verett, M. J. (2006). Performance and usage of biometrics in a testbed 
environment for tactical purposes. Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA. 
Volger, A. (2006). ArcGIS. Retrieved October 22, 2010 from Zurich, Switzerland: 





Waterfield, B. (2010). Haiti earthquake: 10,000 buried each day in mass graves. 
Telegraph. Retrieved June 30, 2010 from London, United Kingdom: 




Watkins, M. B. (2005). DOD 050906-N-6436W-408. Retrieved October 13, 2010 
from Sunnyvale, CA: Yahoo! Inc.: 
http://www.flickr.com/photos/39735679@N00/691140672/ 
Willey, P. F. (2004). The art of riverine warfare from an asymmetrical approach. 
Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. 
Wilson, B. (2009). N851 naval special warfare branch. Retrieved February 27, 
2010 from Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center: 
http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2009expedition/Wilson.pdf 
Woodward Jr., J. D. (2005). Using biometrics to achieve identity dominance in 
the global war on terrorism. Military Review. Retrieved March 20, 2010 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 103
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
3. Dr. Dan Boger, Chairman, Department of Information Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. Professor Glenn Cook, Associate Chairman 
Department of Information Sciences 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
5. Professor R. Mitchell Brown III 
NWC Monterey Program 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Dr. Karl Pfeiffer, Assistant Professor, Department of Information Sciences 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
7. Commander, Fleet Forces Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
8. Commander, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
9. Commander, Riverine Group One 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
10. Commanding Officer, Riverine Squadron One 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
11. Commanding Officer, Riverine Squadron Two 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 




13. OPNAV N851 
Washington, DC 
 
14. PEO, Littoral and Mine Warfare 
Washington Navy Yard, DC 
 
15. Commanding Officer, Center for Security Forces 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
16. Commanding Officer, USCG Joint Maritime Training Center 
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina 
 
17. Commanding Officer, Expeditionary Combat Readiness Center 
Virginia Beach, Virginia 
 
18. Commander, Maritime Expeditionary Security Group One 
San Diego, California 
 
19. Commander, Maritime Expeditionary Security Group Two 
Portsmouth, Virginia 
 
20. Commander, Amphibious Squadron Eight 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
21. Vice President and Director, Advanced Technology & Systems Analysis 
Center for Naval Analysis 
Alexandria, Virginia 
 
22. Commander, Surface Warfare Development Group 
Norfolk, Virginia 
 
23. Commander, Dahlgren Division Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren, Virginia 
 
24. Commander, Port Hueneme Division Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Port Hueneme, California 
 
25. Commander, Carderock Division Naval Surface Warfare Center 
West Bethesda, Maryland 
 
26. Director, Carderock Division Naval Surface Warfare Center, Detachment 
Norfolk 
Norfolk, Virginia 
